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Making and Changing Laws in Ancient Athens 
Forthcoming in the Oxford Handbook of Ancient Greek Law 
Mirko Canevaro (The University of Edinburgh) 
 
Abstract 
This chapter explores the development of ideas about legislation and legislative 
procedures in ancient Athens. It isolates an ideology of legislation that mistrusted 
legal change, and that came into conflict with democratic ideas and practices. It then 
discusses the creation of nomothesia procedures at the end of the fifth century BCE 
that reconciled the need for legal change with that for consistent and stable laws, and 
follows the workings of these procedures throughout the fourth century BCE. 
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1. Introduction: canon formulas, rules of change and the Athenian democracy 
 
Laws change, are modified and fall out of use as a result of changes in political 
institutions and social practices. On the other hand, legal systems show a general 
concern with the consistency and predictability of their laws and of the judicial 
decisions that are based on those laws. In order to achieve (and to be seen to maintain) 
consistency and predictability, societies have to ensure a high degree of stability in 
their laws, or at least a general perception that laws are stable. This is why change, 
although inevitable, is not immediately recognised in most ancient legal systems. 
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Change in the law is sometimes denied and sometimes ignored, and legal systems 
often stress instead the antiquity of their laws, their distinguished origins and the 
hallowed (if not divine) status of their authors as a way to enhance their authority. 
Laws change, but not all societies are ready to admit it. 
The very reality of legal change vis-à-vis the need for stability, as has been 
recently argued by Giorgio Camassa, becomes an issue for a society only when norms 
and laws are written down, and the written document preserving outdated statutes can 
contradict any claims that they are fixed and unchanged, thus undermining their 
authority (Camassa 2011: passim). It is not surprising therefore that the greatest 
concern of the earliest extant written collections of laws is not securing smooth 
change when change is needed, but rather denying it and preventing it. One finds 
evidence for this obsession with stability in societies and legal systems as different as 
those of the Near East and Greece during the Archaic period. Legislation in the Near 
East is often in the hands of an autocratic ruler, who is also priest, military leader and 
judge; the monarch formulates his laws in response to a request of the gods, not of the 
people; his laws contain no measures that will allow the subjects to hold their rulers 
accountable. The Greeks, on the other hand, had an absolute mistrust for any form of 
autocratic power, and their first written laws show great concern with preventing 
tyranny, avoiding concentration of power and holding accountable anyone in a 
position of authority. Laws did not come from autocratic rulers, but from lawgivers 
who were represented as outsiders and did not hold political power (Harris 2006: 6-
14). Despite these differences, both Near Eastern and early Greek laws show a 
striking concern with denying legal change: laws are given once and for all, and are 
not supposed to be changed. 
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Notable examples of such concerns are found in the epilogues of the Codes of 
Lipit Ishtar and Hammurabi. The code of Lipit Ishtar, which can be approximately 
dated to the years between 1934 and 1924 BCE, ends with the king’s statement of the 
importance of his undertaking, and then proceeds to bless (briefly) whoever will leave 
his work intact and curse (profusely) whoever will damage, emend or erase the stele: 
 
When I established justice in the lands of Sumer and Akkad, l erected this stela. He who 
will not do anything evil to it, who will not damage my work, who will <not> efface my 
inscription and write his own name on it – may he be granted life and breath of long days; 
may he raise his neck to heaven in the Ekur temple; may the god Enlil's brilliant 
countenance be turned upon him from above. (But) he who does anything evil to it, who 
damages my work, who enters the treasure room, who alters its pedestal, who effaces this 
inscription and writes his own name (in place of mine), or, because of this curse, induces 
an outsider to remove it - that man, whether he is a king, an enu-lord, or an ensi-ruler ( ... 
may he be completely obliterated ... ] May [ ... the god ... ], primary son of the god Enlil, 
not approach; may the seed not enter; ... the mighty one, the seed, ... May he who escapes 
from the weapon, after he enters (the safety of) his house, may he not have [any heirs]. 
May [the gods ... ], Ashnan, and Sumukan, lords of abundance, [withhold(?) the bounty of 
heaven and] earth. [ ... ] May [ ... ] the god Enlil [ ... ] revoke the gift of the lofty Ekur 
temple. May the god Utu, judge of heaven and earth, remove the august word. [ ... ] its 
foundation bring into his house(?) ... May he make his cities into heaps of ruins. May the 
foundations of his land not be stable, may it have no king. May the god Ninurta, mighty 
warrior, son of the god Enlil, [ ... ] (tr. Roth) 
 
A similar passage in the code of Hammurabi (1792-1750 BCE) is even more 
interesting, because the focus moves from the physical preservation of the stele to that 
of the laws themselves: 
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May any king who appears in this land at any time at all in the future heed the righteous 
commands that I have inscribed on this stone. May no one change the justice for the land 
which I have ordained and the verdicts for the land which I have rendered. May no one 
remove my graven image. If he is a man of intelligence, who is able to direct his land 
aright, let him adhere to the commands I have written on this stela, and let this stela 
explain to him the customs and traditions, the social problems I have encountered and the 
decisions I have taken for the community. So then may he direct the mass of humanity 
aright, let him consider their problems, let him take decisions for them. Let him weed out 
evil and wickedness from his land, let him improve the condition of his people. I am 
Hammurabi the king of righteousness, to whom Shamash has entrusted the truth. My 
words are special. My deeds cannot be surpassed. It is only to the senseless they are 
meaningless; to the wise they are a cause for praise. If that man has paid attention to the 
commandments that I have inscribed on this stone and has not cast aside my rules, if he 
has not changed my commandments or emended what I have written, Shamash will surely 
make that man's rule last for as long as he has made mine last, the rule of the king of 
righteousness. He shall feed his flock in pastures of righteousness. If that man has not 
paid attention to the commandments that I have inscribed on this stone and if he has 
forgotten my threatened curses and has shown no fear for the curses threatened by god, 
and if he has destroyed the rules I ordained and changed my commandments and 
emended what I have written, and if he has removed my name from the inscription and 
inscribed his own or has forced someone else to do it because of these threatened curses, 
almighty Anu, the father of the gods, the one who designed me to rule, will surely remove 
from him the splendour of sovereignty, whether that man is a king or a lord or a governor 
or a person appointed to some other function, and he will smash his staff and curse his 
destiny. 
 
Such passages are usually referred to by scholars as canon formulas, and their 
purpose is that of securing the immutability of the laws, connected to the memory of 
the monarch (Levinson 2009). We could list many other examples from Near-Eastern 
legal texts, but it will suffice here to quote Deuteronomy 4.1-2, where Moses, on the 
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authority of God rather than on his own as king, proclaims: ‘And now, O Israel, give 
heed to the laws and rules that I am instructing you to observe, so that you can live to 
enter and occupy the land that the Lord, the God of your Fathers, is giving you. You 
shall not add anything to what I command you, or take anything away from it, but 
keep the commandments of the Lord your God that I enjoin upon you’ (trans. 
Levinson). 
 In contrast with this tradition, Western legal thought stresses the importance of 
the existence of ‘rules of change’ in the development of legal orders (in Hart’s analysis 
‘rules of change’ are among the ‘secondary rules’ of which the law is constituted). 
There are of course various ways in which laws can be changed and innovation in 
legislation achieved: through statutory change (the simple passing of a new enactment 
that overrules previous ones), through creative interpretation of the open texture of 
existing statutes, or through revolutionary change (Schwartzberg 2007: 3-8). Statutory 
change can in fact be achieved, and in ancient times often was achieved, without an 
explicit admission that the new statute modified previous norms. With a bit of 
ingenuity, legal change can occur without any explicit statement that innovation is 
taking place. Because legal change over long periods of time is a normal occurrence 
for societies, it is not in itself particularly remarkable that it can be found also in 
societies where laws and rules were governed by canon formulas. But in order to 
establish  a legal order, the explicit existence of ‘rules of change’ is key, because such 
rules recognize, institutionalize and govern legal change, so that change can happen 
legitimately and without disrupting the legal order. This is also why, in modern 
accounts of the ‘rule of law’, clear procedures and rules for making laws are 
considered one of the condiciones sine quibus non (cf. Raz 1977). A recent 
investigation of the role and importance of ‘rules of change’ shows them to be at the 
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root of the western concept of law, and identifies Rome as the first and only ancient 
society where such rules were explicitly formulated (Halpérin 2009). Historians do 
indeed agree that in Rome, as early as the Twelve Tables, the principle lex posterior 
derogat priori was the rule in matters of legislation (i.e. a new law which contradicts a 
previous one implicitly repeals it, and the newest law is the one valid at any given 
time). As will become clear toward the end of this chapter, however, Rome was not 
the only ancient society in which the legal order includes formal mechanisms to 
incorporate change in legislation. Such explicit ‘rules of change’ which conform to an 
impressive extent to the requirements of the ‘rule of law’ in matters of legislation as 
they are expressed e.g. by legal theorists such as Raz (1977), existed already in Athens 
during the fourth century BC. The fourth-century Athenian laws on legislation gave 
Athens a clear set of norms that gave the people the power of, and a procedure for, 
enacting new laws and changing existing ones. 
 The Athenian case is particularly interesting not only for the level of 
sophistication achieved by ‘rules of change’ in the fourth century BC, but also because 
such rules of change are not a characteristic feature of Greek legal systems from early 
on. Early Athens, like the other poleis during the Archaic and early Classical periods, 
subscribed to a large extent to a conception of the law as unmovable and unchangeable 
that is similar the conception found in the canon formulas of the Near-Eastern laws. 
Comprehensive procedures that recognized and regulated innovation in legislation 
were implemented as the Athenians came to deal with increasing inconsistencies 
between an ideology of legislation that denied change and a political system that 
affirmed popular sovereignty. The wealth of evidence for the decisive years of this 
process at the end of the fifth century BCE puts us in a privileged position: we are able 
to observe the Athenians as they, with only a few false steps, dealt constructively with 
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the contradictions inherent in their legal system and ideology and eventually 
recognized legal change and created formal mechanisms for achieving it. As they did 
this, they conciliated it with popular sovereignty and created extremely sophisticated 
rules of change that were to a great extent a development of, rather than a break from, 
the previous legislative practices and ideology. (The word ‘ideology’ is here used not 
to refer to an overarching political worldview, but rather to a set of interconnected 
beliefs and preferences that are attached to particular institutional contexts and 
condition individual and institutional behaviour in that particular domain; cf. Meyer, 
Sahlin, Ventresca, Walgenbach 2009: 1-15 for a discussion of various modern 
approaches to ideology and institutions.)  
This chapter takes a primarily diachronic approach to Athenian legislation and 
examines the ideologies and debates underlying particular institutions and procedures 
in different periods. The key procedures at different times will be described, but what 
will be avoided is a ‘snapshot’ view of these procedures focused too exclusively on the 
Realien of day-to-day legislative activity at one particular moment. An approach that 
concentrates too much on the details of legislative rules without examining broad 
trends has yielded some paradoxical results. The most notable of these, which this 
chapter challenges, is the widely-held belief that the creation of detailed rules for 
legislative change represented a limitation of popular sovereignty in the Athenian 
democracy, and that the transition from the fifth century to the fourth century brought 
about a shift from an extreme form of democracy to the sovereignty of the law. 
Kahrstedt (1938, heavily criticized in Atkinson 1939) gives, to my knowledge, the first 
full formulation of this widespread tenet. The most influential exposition of this view 
is given by Ostwald (1986; 524): ‘In matters of legislation the Assembly relinquished 
its final say to nomothetai. Thus democracy achieved stability, consistency, and 
 8 
continuity when the higher sovereignty of nomos limited the sovereignty of the 
people’ (contra Sealey 1982 and 1987, who believed that Athens always had the rule 
of law, and never real democracy). Hansen (1974 and 1991: 150-55, 300-4) has also 
stressed that the locus of sovereignty shifted from the Assembly to the lawcourts 
(which have a stronger connection with the law), and Todd (1990: 170) claims that 
‘Athens was certainly constitutionally less democratic in the mid-fourth century’. Such 
statements are in striking contrast both with assessments of fourth-century democracy 
in contemporary authors and with the epigraphical evidence from the period: the word 
demokratia (although found in literary texts starting in the 430s) is never found in 
Athenian public documents preserved on stone before the restoration of democracy of 
403 (the very constitutional change that most scholars interpret as a shift from popular 
sovereignty to the rule of law; the decree containing the term at Andoc. 1.96-8, 
attributed to 410, is a forgery – see Canevaro-Harris 2012: 119-125 and Harris, 
forthcoming b, pace Sommerstein 2014), but becomes very common afterwards 
(Harris, forthcoming a). The fourth-century orators refer to the regime in Athens as a 
demokratia all the time (cf. e.g. [Dem.] 59.88, Aeschin. 1.4-6, 3.6-7, Lyc. 1.3) with no 
contrast ever made with the rule of law (cf. Harris, forthcoming a and 2013a passim). 
The Constitution of the Athenians, by Aristotle or a student of his, states that ([Arist.] 
Ath. Pol. 41): 
 
The eleventh [and final phase of the Athenian democracy, the fourth-century one] was the 
one which came into being after the return of the exiles from Phyle and the Piraeus, from 
which date it continued to exist until it reached its present form, all the time granting even 
more power to the people. For the people has placed itself in control of everything and 
administers everything through its decrees and its courts, in which the people holds the 
power. 
 9 
 
And Aristotle himself in the Politics (1298b13-15), writing presumably in the 330s, 
states that ‘the democracy which is most considered to be democracy nowadays is one 
in which the demos is master over the laws – namely an extreme democracy’ (trans. 
Strauss). And what is the democracy that is most considered a real democracy in 
Aristotle’s day if not Athens? Aristotle had previously explained that the main feature 
of extreme democracy is that the plethos and not the nomos is sovereign, and this 
translates into a situation in which the psephismata (decrees) and not the laws are 
sovereign (1292a1-7; cf. e.g. Strauss 1991 on the identification in the Politics of the 
Athens of Aristotle’s day with extreme democracy). We will come back to these 
statements once the developments from the fifth to the fourth century and the 
legislative innovations introduced in 403 are examined. For the moment however it 
suffices to observe how different the Athenian view of developments in their political 
institutions during the fourth century BC is from that of scholars such as Ostwald and 
Hansen. This difference of opinions deserves scrutiny.  
 
2. The unchangeability of the law: archaic lawgivers and entrenchment clauses 
 
 In Athens during the Archaic and early Classical periods, as well as in the 
other poleis, rules of change were not the norm. In this respect, the approach to 
changes in legislation recalled the Near-Eastern model of the canon formulas. A law 
from Argos dated between 575 and 550 BCE (Nomima I.100 = IG IV 506), possibly 
listing major crimes against the state (Jeffery 1961: 158), prescribes curses (as in the 
Near-Eastern examples quoted before) as well as exile and confiscation of all property 
for whoever ‘ignores the following provisions or deletes them’. Another law from the 
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last quarter of the sixty century (Nomima I.44 = ML 13, preserved on a bronze 
plaque), provides a Locrian colony, possibly Naupactus, with regulations about land. 
The law has the familiar list of penalties and curses for whoever annuls its provisions: 
 
Unless under the pressure of war a majority of 101 men chosen from the best citizens 
decide to bring in at least 200 fighting men as additional settlers, whoever proposes a 
division or puts it to a vote in the council of elders or in the city (polis), or in the elected 
body, or makes civil strife about the division of land, he himself and his family shall be 
accursed for all time, his property shall be confiscated and his house demolished just as 
under the law (tethmos) about homicide. This law (tethmos) shall be sacred to Pythian 
Apollo and the gods who dwell with him; may there be destruction on the person who 
transgresses it, on him and his family and his possessions, but may (the god) be kindly to 
him who observes it. (Trans. Gagarin) 
 
These formulas, which have been studied (for Athens) in an article by D. M. 
Lewis (1997: 136-49; cf. also Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 524-5), are usually referred to 
by Greek historians and epigraphers as ‘entrenchment clauses’. They perform the very 
same role as the canon formulas we discussed with Lipit Ishtar and Hammurabi, 
although the role in which the Greek legislator casts himself is very different from that 
taken by the king in the Near-Eastern codes – the fixity of the laws acquires in Greek 
thought a distinctly anti-tyrannical flavour (see Harris 2006: 5-14 with Hdt. 3.81). 
Similar measures discouraging or altogether forbidding any changes in the laws are 
recorded by later sources for many mythical or semi-mythical archaic legislators: 
Diod. 12.17 reports that Charondas of Catania stipulated that whoever wanted to 
propose a revision of one of the existing laws should do so with his neck in a noose, 
and if the proposal were unsuccessful he should be hanged. The same rule is attributed 
by Dem. 24.139-41 (cf. also Polyb. 12.16.9-14) to Zaleucus of Locris. These stories, 
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although found only in later sources and probably apocryphal, reveal that the Greeks 
of later periods viewed archaic legislation as a una tantum process usually 
accomplished by wise and authoritative lawgivers, by whom norms and laws were 
written down for ever, not to be changed or modified. A fragment of a text about 
innovation in legislation conveys the same message: the Anonymous of Iamblicus (Vit. 
Pit. 256), borrowing the formulation from the Pythagorical Sentences of Aristoxenus, 
states that the Pythagoreans ‘considered just to stay faithful to the ancestral customs 
and norms, even if slightly inferior to those of others, because to abandon easily the 
existing laws and to be inclined to introduce innovations would be neither convenient 
nor useful’. The frequent occurrence of the phrase kata ta patria (‘according to the 
ancestral customs’) both in inscriptions (it was often prescribed e.g. that sacrifices to 
the gods should be conducted kata ta patria; cf. e.g. IG II2 1283 ll. 25-6; 1289 l. 8; 
1325 ll. 23-4; 1326 ll. 15-16) and in literary sources (Thuc. 2.2.4; 4.98.8; 4.118.8) also 
attests to the importance of adhering to the laws and customs of the ancestors, and to 
the widespread mistrust of legal innovation. Legislation was not the same as 
administration, and laws were given once and for all, hence the canon formulas and 
the entrenchment clauses. 
If we turn to Athens during the Archaic period we find the same kinds of 
entrenchment clauses, and similar legends about legislators sealing their work and 
forbidding or discouraging change. The first recorded Athenian legislator is Draco, 
traditionally dated to 621/0. The information about his legislative action is mostly 
apocryphal and fragmentary at best, but we are lucky enough to have the stele where 
his law on (involuntary) homicide was republished in 409/8 (IG I3 104), and the 
linguistic features of the text confirm that this must be a seventh-century law. The 
stele is very fragmentary and does not allow us to read any entrenchment clause. 
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Demosthenes (23) however reports various provisions from this law, which can be 
checked against the inscription and are accurate (cf. Canevaro 2013: 38-46 passim). 
He concludes (Dem. 23.62) his discussion of Draco’s law by reporting this provision 
(which must therefore be reliable too): 
 
Whoever, whether a magistrate or a private citizen, is cause of the violation of this statute, 
or will modify it, is to be disenfranchised, with his children and his goods. 
 
There is more information about another Athenian lawgiver, Solon, whose 
legislation, traditionally dated to 594 BCE, was regarded in Classical Athens as the 
very foundation of the legal and political order of the city. Later laws, as late as the 
fourth century, were often wrongly attributed to him, and his legislative aims were 
often invoked by litigants during the fourth century BC to justify particular 
interpretations of a statute. The expression ‘the laws of Solon’ was often used to mean 
‘the laws of Athens’ (see e.g. Hansen 1989 and Thomas 1994). Yet Solon’s historicity 
is beyond doubt because we possess his poems, one of which (fr. 36 West) explicitly 
states ‘I have written laws (thesmous) equally for the low and high alike, fitting 
straight justice to each’ (Hölkeskamp 2005: 189 n. 33 with bibliography). His 
legislation must have been extensive (although it is incorrect to refer to his laws as a 
‘code’; cf. Hölkeskamp 1999 and 2005; his must have been rather a collection of pre-
existing norms, a ‘common law’, cf. Schmitz 2004: 148-259 and Harris OHAGL on 
archaic law). His laws were written down on kyrbeis and were still legible in the fourth 
century on axones (see Stroud 1979, Davis 2011 with previous bibliography on these 
items), and many of them are quoted and discussed in later sources even though it may 
be difficult to tell which ones are authentically Solonian (see above all Ruschenbusch 
1966, Rhodes 2004 and the essays by Blok, Gagarin, Rhodes and Scafuro in Blok-
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Lardinois 2004 for various approaches, some more convincing than others). There is 
no secure evidence for an entrenchment clause in the laws generally attributed to 
Solon, but various sources recount us a story that, like those about Charondas or 
Zaleucus, demonstrates the lawgiver’s attempt to avoid any change or revision of the 
laws. Both [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.2 and Plut. Sol. 25 tell us that after Solon gave the 
Athenians the laws, he had them swear by the gods not to change them for 100 years, 
and to make sure that they could not force him to change them himself, he left Athens 
for ten years (Hdt. 1.29 reports the very same story, but with the Athenians bound for 
ten years, and Solon also travelling for ten years – it is likely that the first figure is 
corrupt and merged into the other). One should consider that a period of 100 years, 
three generations, is in oral societies as far back or ahead as one can get, and 100 years 
is therefore usually employed to mean ‘forever’ (cf. Camassa 2011: 119). The same 
time entrenchment is found also in interstate treaties from the Archaic period (cf. e.g. 
Nomima I.52 and Manfredini - Piccirilli 1990: 255). Solon therefore effectively 
entrenched his laws, and later Athenians understood his intention as such. It must also 
be noted that although Solon was asked (and elected) by the Athenians to give them 
laws, there is no sign in the sources that his laws were enacted or approved by the 
Athenians – he bound them to follow the laws by making them swear an oath to this 
effect.  
 
3. Solon and the nomothetic tradition in fifth century Athens 
 
In the fifth century (that is, as soon as we have enough literary evidence to 
check), Solon was already recognized as the creator of the laws of Athens: Herodotus 
(1.29) introduces him as the man who gave laws to the Athenians at their request, and 
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Cratinus (fr. 274 Kock) refers to him and Draco while mentioning the kyrbeis where 
the laws were written down. Aristophanes’ Clouds (1187), performed in 423 BCE, has 
Pheidippides explaining to his father the law on summons by appealing to the intent of 
Solon in the very same way litigants do in fourth-century speeches (e.g. Hyp. Athen. 
13-22; Dem. 18.6, 22.8-11, 25, 30, 36.27, [Dem.] 58.11; Lyc. 1.9; Lys. 31.27; Isae. 
2.13). In the Birds (1660) a law on bastard sons not being entitled to inherit is also 
attributed to Solon. Because the laws of Athens, as soon as the fifth century, derived to 
a large extent their validity from the authority of Solon as a lawgiver, it is useful at this 
point to describe the conception of legislation implicit in the laws of Draco and Solon. 
We should expect this to be reflected in the fifth-century Athenian ideology of 
legislation, or at least as part of a debate on legislation and innovation in legislation.  
Viewing the laws as the product of Solon’s individual achievement implies 
first and foremost an institutionalized understanding that laws should not be changed. 
Although the Athenians elected Solon to give them laws, they subsequently bound 
themselves to follow them and keep them unchanged by swearing an oath. So, 
although the lawgiver is not an autocratic king and is appointed by the community, the 
laws derive their authority not simply from the vote of a sovereign Assembly, but also 
from the personal authority of the lawgiver himself, recognized by the citizens in their 
oath. As a result, legislation is not part of the daily business of the polis (legislation is 
separated from administration, see Harris 2006: 12, 15-16), but rather a special 
enterprise undertaken by special nomothetai at special times. Laws therefore acquire 
from their origin in the action of a nomothetes some characteristics that will heavily 
condition later developments of legislation, in particular in 403 BCE, when the 
Athenians eventually dealt with the relevant institutions and defined what a law is. 
They are meant to be valid forever, so they are not temporary measures, and they are 
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not the same as other, more ordinary decisions and actions taken by the polis in 
response to their day-to-day business. Moreover, since they were created by an 
individual nomothetes, they are the product of a unified intention and rationality 
(Harris 2013: 201-2). Therefore, despite the fact that Solon’s laws did not amount to a 
‘code’, the Athenians understood them as part of a system, carrying an inherent 
rationality, and as consistent and coherent (Canevaro, forthcoming b; pace 
Hölkeskamp 1999: passim).  
The existence and extent of such a conception of laws and legislation are clear in 
many passages from Athenian literature of the fifth century BC. One particular 
passage from Antiphon (5.14–15 = 6.2), who praises Draco’s laws on homicide, 
expresses beautifully the Athenian veneration for the oldest laws, their authority, and 
the belief in their perfect coherence:  
 
I think that all would agree that the laws that are established about such matters are the 
finest and most righteous of all the laws. They are indeed the oldest laws in this land, and 
furthermore they are absolutely consistent [literally ‘they are the same about the same 
things’], which is the greatest indication that laws have been well made. For time and 
human experience teach men what is unsound […] And thus the laws about homicide, 
which no one has ever dared to overturn, have been established in the best way’ (trans. 
Harris). 
 
In a passage from Aristophanes’ Clouds (1187), performed in 423 BCE, 
Pheidippides explains to his father the law about issuing a summons by appealing to 
the intent of Solon, also shows how Solon was considered the foundational authority 
of Athenian law, and how the coherence and consistency of his legislation could be 
predicated on his overall intent. In Aeschylus’ Eumenides the theme of the unchanging 
nature of the laws is central: at l. 484 Athena says that she ‘will lay down a law for all 
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time’ (cf. also ll. 570-3) and at ll. 690-5 after founding the court of the Areopagus she 
explicitly states that ‘upon [this hill], the respect and inborn fear of the citizens will 
prevent any wrong being done, alike by day and by night, if the citizens themselves do 
not make innovative additions to the laws: if you sully clear water with foul infusions 
of mud, you will never get a drink’ (trans. Sommerstein). Athena, as a lawgiver, gives 
laws because of her own authority, and these laws must not be changed. In Sophocles’ 
Antigone, when Creon eventually realizes his mistake in ordering that Polyneices stay 
unburied and in condemning Antigone to death for contravening his order, he ruefully 
admits: ‘I fear that it is best to live one’s life until  the end preserving the established 
laws’ (1113-14, trans. Harris). He realizes that his order contradicts and overrules a 
divine law, that the dead should be buried, and so effectively a temporary rule decreed 
by him in response to a matter of daily business, a decree enacted by the ruling power 
in the city, contravenes and changes the ‘established laws’ (used only here in the entire 
play; on law, divine law and the Antigone see Harris 2006: 41-80). A hierarchy 
between the ‘established laws’ and ‘any put into force in future’ is also established in 
the Ephebic Oath (RO 88, a fourth-century inscription, but parts and elements of the 
oath are believed to be archaic) when the ephebes’ obedience to the second category is 
qualified by the adverb ‘reasonably’ (emphronos): ‘And I shall be obedient […] to the 
laws currently in force and any reasonably put into force in future.’ 
While a hierarchy between the laws of the lawgiver and the enactments of the 
community are clearly implied in much of our evidence, it is notable how, with the 
growing power of the demos from the late sixth century on, and the widening of the 
scope of their political action, the ideology of legislation derived from the action of the 
archaic nomothetai, which we could call ‘nomothetic’, is used to give durability and 
authority to more recent enactments. In Aristophanes’ Thesmophoriazousae (ll. 352-
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71) the chorus lists women who are impious and harm the city, and among these are 
women who attempt to alter psephismata and nomos. While the use of the singular 
nomos opposed to the plural psephismata seems to imply some sort of hierarchy 
between the law as a sphere and the individual enactments of the Assembly 
(psephisma, connected with the psephos, the ballot, refers to measures voted by the 
people), it is notable how both need to be left untouched, and how altering them is 
equated with harming the city. That laws should not be changed is also the key 
contention in Cleon’s argument in the Mytilenian debate, and yet the passage is vague 
on what exactly it is that should not be changed: a decree of the previous day about 
slaughtering all the male Mytileneans, a law about not altering previous enactments, or 
perhaps a law about not revolting during war time based on the allies’ oaths (Thuc. 
3.37.3-4; cf. Harris 2013b: 98 n. 19). In 427 BCE the Athenians manage to subdue the 
rebellious Mytileneans and decree in the Assembly, advised by Cleon, that all males 
should be killed. The next day Diodotus manages to reopen the discussion so that the 
Athenians may change their mind and avoid the slaughter. Cleon argues against this 
proposal that ‘The most alarming feature in the case is the constant change of 
measures with which we appear to be threatened, and our seeming ignorance of the 
fact that bad laws which are never changed (nomoi akinetoi) are better for a city than 
good ones that have no authority’ (3.37.3, trans. Crowley). Argumentative strategies 
typical of the nomothetic tradition are made to apply more widely also to other 
enactments, even decrees by the demos, in order for them to acquire authority and 
durability. By doing this, the Athenians seem to blur the distinction between 
legislation and administration that is implied in the nomothetic tradition, and add to 
the laws of the polis, those of Draco and Solon, the enactments of the demos. This 
development, as we shall see, will give rise at the end of the fifth century to important 
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debates which will mark the various attempts of reform. Yet even in this development 
there is no trace of any explicit rules of change: enactments of the demos can 
supplement the laws of the lawgiver, but they do not modify them, nor do they cancel 
them, and in fact, when they need to be made particularly stable, they are themselves 
deemed unchangeable, and sometimes, as we shall see, made so.  
 
4. The reality of Athenian legislation in fifth-century Athens: immutability and 
tacit legal change 
 
Before exploring how legislation worked in the fifth century and how it was 
reconciled with the ideology of unchanging stability, it is necessary now to discuss 
some important points about legal terminology. Up to this point I have deliberately 
avoided using Greek words to refer to statutes, and have preferred the English term 
‘law’ according to the use of the term by legal anthropologists such as Pospisil (1974): 
1) there is an authority with the power to enforce the law; 2) the law is meant to be the 
same for all, and to be applied to all similar situations in the future; 3) there is a part of 
the law that “states the rights of one party to a dispute and the duties of the other”; 4) 
the law contains a sanction. The reason for which I avoided a specific Greek term is 
that until the end of the fifth century no Greek term is used exclusively to describe a 
binding rule or enactment consistent with such a definition: although all of them are 
often used to describe such binding rules or enactments, they are also used for 
temporary, ad hoc enactments. In fact, the application of the word nomos exclusively 
to rules that conform to the concept of ‘law’ that I have just provided is a product of 
the developments I am describing, rather than their precondition.  
The Greeks used various terms to indicate a binding rule or enactment: Draco’s 
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and Solon’s are referred to in sources from the Archaic period as thesmoi (this is the 
word Solon himself uses), with a focus on the laying down of the law (tithemi) which 
characterizes legislation, consistently with what we have been saying, as a top-down 
activity. But one should not read too much into the difference between the terms 
thesmos and nomos, which are often used interchangeably (Hölkeskamp 2002: 123-6). 
Terms such as graphos and grammata refer to the written dimension of the law (as 
opposed to rhetra, ‘what has been said’), whereas the term nomos is connected to the 
verb nemein, ‘to distribute’, ‘to allocate’ (Ostwald 1969: ch. 1; Quass 1971; de 
Romilly 2001: ch. 1; Hölkeskamp 2002; Harris 2006: 41-61).  In fifth-century Athens 
words like thesmos and graphos are rare in reference to rules and enactments (thesmos 
is used only occasionally to refer to Solon’s and Draco’s laws), but the word nomos is 
used along with psephisma (normally translated as “decree”), which refers to the act of 
voting on something in a sovereign Assembly. None of these terms perfectly and 
exclusively covers the semantic range we have isolated with Pospisil’s definition 
(although most of them can be used for rules or enactments that are consistent with 
Pospisil’s definition), and although the terms have different focuses, they are mostly 
used interchangeably, with nomos used more commonly when the focus is on the 
contents of a rule, psephisma when the focus is on the enactment of the rule (Hansen 
1978: 316). To give only two examples, the law of Cannonus about offences against 
the demos is a nomos at Xen. Hell. 1.7.20, but a psephisma at 23. And the decree of 
Isotimides is a psephisma at Andoc. 1.71, 86, 103, but a nomos at Lys. 6.9, 29.52. 
Because we lack clear-cut distinctions, terminology is not a reliable guide in exploring 
whether, and how, laws were enacted and innovation in legislation happened in the 
fifth century. Using Pospisil’s analysis of the features implicit in the term ‘law’ will 
help us to distinguish laws from decrees, that is, enactments with a limited application 
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in time and scope arising from the day-to-day administration of the polis. On the other 
hand, the fluid nature of these terms helps to explain how concepts and ideologies 
originally attached to the nomothetic tradition could be extended to cover recent 
enactments of the Assembly, and how this in turn caused debates and disagreement 
about what is legitimate legislation and what is not. 
It should not come as a surprise that in the fifth century the Athenians did enact 
‘laws’, that is, general provisions with broad application, and that some of these laws 
did in fact modify the previous legislation of Draco and Solon. To give only a few 
examples, we know that Cleisthenes at the end of the sixth century enacted new laws 
(kainoi nomoi, [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.1), e.g. created a new Council of 500, whose 
numbers were determined by his new distribution of the Athenians in ten tribes. Some 
of these regulations are likely to have survived in the republished IG I3 105 (Rhodes 
1972: 194–199; Shear 2011: 76-8), which refers to a Council of 500. If we believe that 
Solon enacted at least some constitutional laws (and whether we believe in his Council 
of 400 or not; see Rhodes 2006), Cleisthenes must have modified them at least to some 
extent, and his reforms are evidence not only of legislation but of modification of 
previous laws. On the other hand, it is still possible that Cleisthenes’ action could be 
represented as the special action of a nomothetes, the same way as Solon’s was, and 
[Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.3 has Kleitophon in 411 propose that the syngrapheis search for 
his patrioi nomoi (ancestral laws), which are similar to those of Solon. His legislative 
innovation could still be consistent with the nomothetic tradition, as Cleisthenes is a 
special nomothetes who restores democracy after tyranny.  
But we know of rules passed at a much later date that can be categorized within 
our definition of ‘law’, and which must have been passed by the Assembly. For 
example Callias’ decree of 434/3 (ML 58B), which orders magistrates to spend money 
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exclusively on the construction of the Acropolis, or else ask the Assembly for 
authorization to use them for other purposes, imposes at ll. 17-19 on those who violate 
these provisions the same penalty that is inflicted on those that propose an eisphora, a 
special direct tax for war expenses, without first asking adeia. The use of eisphora is 
first attested in 428 (Thuc. 3.19.1), and eisphora as we see it in the classical age was 
not created much earlier than this date (Rhodes 1981: 193; Kallet-Marx 1989: 112-13 
n. 84; cf. van Wees 2013: 84-97 for eisphora in the Archaic period). So we have here a 
new law, enacted by the Assembly. Yet this law may not be an actual modification of 
previous statutes. By this period the Assembly is legislating, but this example does not 
prove that it occasionally changed previous laws. The same however cannot be said of 
the various reforms of the archonship as they are reported in [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.5, 
26.2, 47.1: the archonship was originally restricted to the pentakosiomedimnoi, and the 
archons were elected, but from 487 the archons were selected by lot, and from 457 
zeugitai were granted the right to be archons (see however Ryan 2002, who believes 
that zeugitai could be archons earlier; see Surikov 2012 for a recent account). And 
Pericles’ citizenship law of 451/0, which restricted Athenian citizenship only to those 
who had both an Athenian father and an Athenian mother ([Arist.] Ath Pol. 26.4; Plut. 
Per. 37.2-5), must have altered some previous statutes and rules. These must have 
been actual changes to the laws of the city, and are evidence that such changes did 
happen.  
So what should we conclude from this? Should we infer that the claims about the 
unchangeability of the laws, consistent with the nomothetic tradition, expressed ideas 
that in the fifth century had no connection with reality, and that rules of change did in 
fact exist, in the form of the principle lex posterior derogat priori? The sources do not 
warrant this conclusion. Legislative changes, as has been observed at the beginning of 
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this chapter, are, as it were, a fact of life, and should not surprise us too much. What is 
more interesting is whether these changes are institutionally recognized and, if they are 
not, what are the consequences for the legal order. Changes can be introduced as new 
laws without explicit recognition that they contradict previous laws that are entrenched 
and cannot be repealed. The two laws stay valid at the same time, and if the older law 
is in practice superseded, there is no institutional recognition that it is now invalid, and 
no attempt whatsoever is made to harmonize the legal order. In such a context, in 
which there are no rules of change, old statutes could theoretically, on occasion, be 
used by litigants, who therefore act within an inconsistent legal order that falls short of 
the rule of law. Moreover, any change in the laws disrupts the legal order, which does 
not contemplate such changes, and therefore is to an extent illegitimate, or at least 
prone to be represented as illegitimate in particular political contexts.  
 Both these issues are found in our sources about fifth-century Athens: we will 
see that in the last decade of the fifth century the Athenians undertook to republish the 
laws of Draco and Solon, and evidence of the republication shows that later statutes 
were also encompassed under this rubric. This undertaking evinces uneasiness with the 
current status of their legal order, presumably confused and unmanageable, which they 
aimed to correct by collecting all the laws of the city and republishing them near the 
Stoa of the basileus, in an easily accessible place. The accusation made against 
Nicomachus (Lys. 30.3), one of the anagrapheis in charge of the process, that parties 
in suits received the laws from his hands and would show up at the trial with opposite 
laws stating opposite rules, may be further evidence of the existence of contradictory 
laws that were concurrently valid. The speaker blames this on Nicomachus, who was 
in his opinion usurping the role of a nomothetes, but this is slander within the context 
of an accusation speech. It is possible that if litigants could produce opposite laws, this 
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was because there were already contradictory laws, and none of them had formally 
been abrogated. Lex posterior non derogat priori, it just becomes valid side by side 
with it. In any case, the possibility of such an accusation shows a widespread 
uneasiness with the state of the laws of the city. 
As for the issue of the legitimacy of such unrecognized and unregulated changes, 
the very frequency of the claims in Athenian sources that laws should not be changed 
is at least evidence that illegitimate changes in the laws were recognized as a problem. 
The issue became even more central in the context of the various oligarchic 
revolutions of the late fifth century. The various successive regimes – the Four 
Hundred, the Five Thousand, the Thirty – all justified their existence and the 
disruptions to normal democratic institutions as an attempt to go back to the patrioi 
nomoi and the patrios politeia. The syngrapheis of 411 were appointed, according to 
Cleitophon’s amendment, to search for the patrioi nomoi of Cleisthenes, ‘because the 
constitution of Cleisthenes was not democratic but similar to that of Solon’ ([Arist.] 
Ath. Pol. 29.3). Their claim that their revolution was in fact meant to go back to the 
ancestral constitution as sanctioned by the lawgivers is an implicit rejection of all 
changes made afterwards. The Five Thousand also tried to appropriate the patrios 
politeia and gained legitimacy by linking their rule to the laws of Draco, Solon and 
Cleisthenes (see Shear 2011:51-3; for various approaches to these regimes see e.g. 
Harris 1990, Osborne 2003 and Shear 2011: 19-69 passim with extensive 
bibliography). The Thirty came to power in 404 BCE, under Spartan pressure, 
following a decree proposed by Dracontides and approved by the Assembly that gave 
them the task of drawing up the ancestral laws (patrioi nomoi) for the city (Xen. Hell. 
2.3.2; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 35.1; cf. Diod. 14-4-I; Fuks 1953: 75- 6; Ostwald 1986: 477-8; 
Shear 2011: 166-87). We know from [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 35.2 that they took down from 
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the Areopagus the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus about the Areopagites, and 
deleted from the laws of Solon those gave rise to disagreements (osoi diamphisbeteseis 
eschon). Their aim with these measures seems to be that of addressing the two main 
problems that fifth-century attitudes to legal change caused in the Athenian legal 
order: the illegitimacy of new laws passed after the sixth-century lawgivers, and the 
inconsistency and lack of clarity and rationality that as a result had been introduced in 
the laws, and which gave rise to disputes (Ostwald 1986:479-80; Krentz 1982:61-2). 
There is also positive evidence that in the fifth century, despite the fact that legal 
change happened, the Athenians still adhered in their political institutions to an 
ideology that was averse to change in legislation, and still considered entrenchment 
clauses a binding and effective safeguard against legal change. We know this because 
they still used such clauses to guarantee permanence to many measures passed in the 
Assembly, often not even laws but rather decrees. We have mentioned before ML 
48B, which ordered that money should be spent for the building program on the 
Acropolis, and if anyone proposed a different use without previous authorization by 
the Assembly, he would suffer the same punishment as those who propose an eisphora 
without previous authorization (ll. 17-19). The Standards Decree about the use of 
weights, measures and coinage in the Athenian Empire, also contains a provision 
inflicting a penalty on those that make a proposal against the terms of the decree, or on 
the magistrate who puts the proposal to the vote (ML 45 cl. 8; cf. Lewis 1997: 136-
49). Why would the Athenians still add entrenchment clauses to their enactments if 
they institutionally recognized that legal change happened and was legitimate? The 
one case we know of in which the Athenians agreed to repeal an entrenchment clause 
in order to contravene with their enactments a previous decree (Thuc. 8.15.1) is 
evidence of how exceptional and outrageous such a decision was felt to be. At the 
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beginning of the Peloponnesian war the Athenians enacted a decree that set aside 
1,000 talents. This could not be touched except in the case of a naval invasion (Thuc. 
2.24). After the defeat in the Sicilian expedition, in 412, they decided to use this 
money, because of the exceptional situation, the enormous losses in men, wealth and 
ships that the expedition had caused, and the general prostration of Athens and the 
wide-spread rebellions in the empire. Yet there was no naval invasion, so the proposal 
would have contravened an entrenched decree. The fact that they agreed to overrule 
the entrenchment clause and touched the money only in a moment of exceptional 
danger for the city, after they had left it untouched for almost twenty years of war, is 
evidence of how seriously they took such clauses. 
To summarize our analysis so far: in the fifth century the Athenians enacted 
decrees and laws, as is natural, yet when one of their enactments contradicted one of 
the existing laws, they ignored the contradiction, and both statutes formally remained 
valid, which resulted in inconsistencies in the legal order of the city. So, while legal 
change actually happened, there were no rules of change, and the institutional ideology 
of the city still adhered to the nomothetic tradition and conceived the laws of the city 
as an unchangeable and coherent whole. The system was characterized by a certain 
‘cognitive dissonance’ regarding legal change, and was ambivalent about new 
legislation tout court. This situation had its critics, and some in the city (as we have 
seen when discussing the revolutions at the end of the century) held that legislation 
was the exclusive province of specially appointed nomothetai, and that laws derived 
their authority not from the demos, but from the legislative action of such lawgivers. 
 At the other end of the spectrum, and in particular in the philosophical circles 
of the Sophists, it was thought that laws were human creations that derived their 
authority from the community and were valid only as long as the community 
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considered them advantageous. Such a conception questioned the nomothetic tradition, 
and proposed to solve the impasse between ideology and practice by adapting the 
ideology to the actual practices of unavoidable legal change, rather than questioning 
legal change and innovation tout court on the grounds of its validity. In Plato’s 
Theaetetus Socrates, reporting the opinions current in Protagoras’ school, states 
(172b2-6) that ‘concerning what is just and what is unjust, what is pious and what is 
impious, they are willing to say with confidence that none of these things has by 
nature an existence of its own, but the opinion that is commonly held, this is true when 
it is adopted and remains true as long as it is adopted’. And at 167c4-5 he simply states 
‘what seems to a polis just and good, this is just and good for it, as long as it believes it 
to be so’. In Xenophon’s Memorabilia (1.2.42), when Alcibiades asks Pericles what he 
thinks a nomos is, Pericles replies simply: ‘Laws are all the rules approved and 
enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they declare what ought and what ought 
not to be done’ (trans. Marchant). This is also the position advocated by Pheidippides, 
a pupil of the sophist Socrates, when he justifies changing the law about beating 
parents (Ar. Nub. 1391-1450): since the law was enacted at one time in the past, I have 
the right to make a new one in the present. Aristophanes reacts in this play and in this 
passage against such a radical position about (among many other issues) legal change. 
 
5. The first attempts to resolve dissonant views and practices of legislation: 
graphe paranomon and oligarchic revolutions 
 
 The Athenians, as they seemed to realize the problems of their legal order and 
proposed various solutions in their theoretical reflections, also attempted at various 
points in the fifth century BC to intervene in the system and solve its contradictions 
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and bad practices. The first of such attempts found in the sources is the institution of 
the graphe paranomon, a public action against measures that violate the laws. This 
procedure is extensively attested for the fourth century, but the sources mention very 
few cases for the period before 403/2. The earliest reliable evidence for this procedure 
is Andoc. 1.17, 22, where we are told of a successful graphe paranomon brought in 
415 by Leagoras of Cydathenaeum against Speusippus for a decree proposed in the 
Council. The case was heard by a panel of 6,000 judges, and the decree was repealed. 
Another case of graphe paranomon against Demosthenes of Aphidna could be 
detected in the title of one of Antiphon’s speeches (Fr. 13, 47), and the trial must be 
dated to before Demosthenes’ departure for Sicily in 414 (Hansen 1974: 28). In 406 
Euryptolemus of Alopeke and others attempt to indict with a graphe paranomon the 
decree of Callixenus that proposes that the Assembly should immediately pass a 
verdict collectively by secret ballot on the generals for not having recovered the dead 
after the battle of Arginusae (Euryptolemus charged this decree as paranomon because 
it did not grant the defendants their right to a normal trial, see Aeschin. 3.197-8; cf. 
Harris 2013a: 242-3). They have to withdraw the summons when Lyciscus passes a 
further decree that proposes to try them with the generals.  
 Scholars have variously placed the creation of this procedure as early as the 
years right after Ephialtes’ reforms in the 460s (e.g. Rhodes 1972: 62) or as late as 
those immediately before 415 (e.g. Wolff 1970: 21). The basic features of the 
procedure are as follows: 1) during the discussion of a bill or after it had been 
approved (Xen. Hell. 1.7.12-14; Dem. 22.5, 9-10; cf. Hansen 1991: 206) anyone 
among the Athenians who wanted to do so could indict the bill for being paranomon, 
that is, against the laws; 2) the accuser had to swear that the decree is illegal 
(hypomosia; cf. Wolff 1970: 28) and later 3) present a written text to the thesmothetai 
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explaining why the decree was illegal, citing as supporting evidence the statutes that 
prove that it is illegal; 4) if one dropped the case after the hypomosia he was fined 
1,000 drachmas and was forbidden to bring any public actions in the future (Harris 
2006: 405-22); 5) the same happened if the accuser failed to receive at least one fifth 
of the votes at the trial; 6) the case was judged by a panel of at least 500 judges and 
possibly as many as 6,000 (Andoc. 1.17); 7) if the accusation was successful, the 
decree was repealed if already enacted, or could not be enacted at all if it had been 
indicted before the vote in the Assembly; 8) if the proposal had not been approved by 
the Assembly before being indicted and the prosecution was unsuccessful, the 
proposal went back to the Assembly for approval (pace Hansen 1987: 63-73; cf. 
Hannick 1981: 393-7); 9) if less than one year had elapsed since the presentation of 
the bill (Dem. 23.104), the proposer could be given any penalty from a small fine to 
death or full atimia (Hyp. Eux. 18; [Dem.] 58.1; for the reconstruction of the 
procedure cf. Wolff 1970 and Hansen 1974, with the further remarks in Hansen 1991: 
205-12). 
 We know that in the fourth century the graphe paranomon enforced the 
principle that psephismata cannot override nomoi (cf. below Section 6), and therefore 
this procedure performed a role akin to that of a modern charge of unconstitutionality, 
repealing decrees that were not in accordance with a hierarchically higher set of rules, 
the nomoi. But in the fifth century this cannot have been the case, because there was 
no clear distinction between nomoi and psephismata (cf. e.g. Wolff 1970: passim and 
Hansen 1974: passim; Sealey 1987: 49-50). What was therefore the rationale of this 
procedure? Some speculation here is necessary, but the very name of the procedure, 
paranomon, implies that the enactments to be indicted and repealed are those that 
contradict some laws (the use of nomos has probably to do with a focus on the 
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contents of existing statutes). This procedure therefore instituted a judicial review (cf. 
Lanni 2010 and Pasquino 2005, 2010 for comparisons of this procedure with modern 
forms of judicial review) of the decisions made in the Assembly by the demos, whose 
main concern was to prevent the enactment of measures that contradicted existing ones 
by providing a chance to repeal them, and to discourage with penalties anyone from 
presenting such proposals. Its role was therefore that of assuring the consistency of the 
laws of the city, which, as we have seen, was a key feature of the ideology of 
legislation. It did this by actively preventing tacit legal change by measures that 
contradicted previous laws but did not do so explicitly. It also provided a legal 
procedure for challenging it. On the other hand, against the wishes of the 
conservatives in the city who denied the legitimacy of legal innovation performed by 
the demos, it implicitly recognized that new legislation enacted by the demos was valid 
and legitimate, as long as it was not inconsistent with previous legislation. So it was 
not only the laws of the sixth-century lawgivers that were legitimate, but also any 
further enactment, with the proviso that if a new law was inconsistent with a previous 
one, the principle lex anterior derogat posteriori applied.  
 Yet this issue could be easily avoided by repealing in the Assembly previous 
enactments that contradicted one’s proposal before enacting it. This is what happened 
during the debate about Mytilene in 427: Cleon convinced the Assembly to pass a 
decree imposing the death penalty on all adult males of the city and slavery for women 
and children. The next day, the Council authorized a new debate on the same topic, 
and at the meeting of the Assembly a new decree was passed, which rescinded Cleon’s 
decree. In 415 Alcibiades convinced the Assembly to send an expedition to invade 
Sicily. At a later meeting of the Assembly, Nicias tried to raise the issue again and 
asked the prytanis to take a new vote on Alcibiades’ earlier decree about the 
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expedition (Thuc. 6.14; cf. Harris 2014, who shows that there was no rule against 
overturning in the Assembly previous decisions of the demos). But what about 
entrenched laws, like the laws of Draco and Solon and presumably most ancient laws 
of the Athenians, as well as many decrees of the fifth century? These could not be 
repealed, and the graphe paranomon did not provide any means for repealing them. 
So, by giving any Athenian the chance to indict a new enactment if it contradicted an 
existing law, this procedure tackled the issue of the contradictory Athenian attitudes to 
legislation by finding a middle ground between the need to recognize the authority of 
the demos and that law is anything the demos approve and the need to respect the 
ancestral laws, which derived their authority from the ancient lawgivers and derived 
their respect from their origin in the distant past. The new procedures allowed for the 
enactment of new rules in the Assembly, without restricting their possible scope in 
day-to-day administration, but at the same time prevented the enactment of anything 
which contradicted the ancestral laws, or any subsequent measure which had been 
entrenched, so preventing legal change, even of a tacit kind.  
Such a solution eventually proved inadequate because it relied on volunteers 
and therefore did not tackle the issue of inconsistent enactments effectively enough. 
Moreover, the middle ground presumably did not satisfy the conservatives (averse to 
any form of legal change by the demos) who tried to change the constitution by 
revolutionary means in the last decade of the fifth century. From the scanty evidence 
we possess, it is clear that they did not consider the laws enacted by the demos after 
the sixth-century lawgivers as legitimate, and they disapproved not only of legal 
change, which the graphe paranomon attempted to tackle, but also of legal innovation 
tout court. We have already mentioned that the Thirty took down from the Areopagus 
the laws of Ephialtes and Archestratus, and rescinded laws that gave rise to 
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disagreements. A particular provision of the ‘Constitution for the present’ expounded 
by [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 31.3 in relation to the activities of the Four Hundred in 411 is 
even more relevant here: the constitution sets various rules and a sovereign Council of 
400, and orders that they must follow any laws that may be enacted about ta politika 
(enacted in this constitution) and not be allowed to change them or enact others. Not 
only is legal change forbidden; no new laws can be enacted at all. (It is immaterial 
here whether this ‘Constitution for the Present’ is believed to have ever been put into 
practice, it is enough that it represents a debate and positions of the late fifth century; 
see for this debate e.g. Rhodes 1981: 365, 385-9, Ostwald 1986: 379-85; Harris 1990; 
1997; Shear 2011: 22-49.) 
It is not surprising therefore that in the late fifth century the Athenian 
oligarchs, when they attempted to gain power and to solve the problems and 
contradictions of the Athenian political and legal system in their own way, should 
follow patterns that are tightly embedded in the nomothetic tradition of legislation. We 
have seen that both the Four Hundred and the Thirty argued that they were in fact 
going back to the patrioi nomoi of Draco, Solon and Cleisthenes, dismissing therefore 
all the enactments of the demos as illegitimate. And they both envisioned constitutions 
in which legal change and the enactment of new laws were actually forbidden (cf. the 
‘constitution for the present’ at the time of the Four Hundred), and took active steps to 
destroy and repeal the enactments of the demos in previous years (e.g. the laws of 
Ephialtes and Archestratus). Yet their own reforms constituted legal change, to such 
an extent that both the Four Hundred and the Thirty had to abolish the procedure of 
graphe paranomon in order to be able to perform it (cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.4 and 
Thuc. 8.67.2 for the Four Hundred, Aeschin. 3.191 for the Thirty).  
How did they justify it, and how did they construct their role? In a recent study 
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of legal change Melissa Schwartzberg (2007: 7-8) explicitly recognized constitutional 
revolution as a means of legal change, and this is the form the oligarchs adopted in 
both instances. The reason for this is that within an ideology that forbade legal change 
as a matter of normal business of the polis, the most legitimate and only acceptable 
instrument for changing the laws and the politeia was the institution of special 
committees, time-bound, who would perform the task of reforming/restoring the 
constitution. So in 411 the oligarchs (according to [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.2 Pythodorus) 
proposed in the Assembly the election of syngrapheis autokratores (ten according to 
Thuc. 8.67, twenty according to [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 29.2): plenipotentiary special 
officials whose job was that of drafting measures for the safety of the city. These 
immediately repealed the graphe paranomon, effectively starting a constitutional 
moment during which they proceeded to propose various new statutes and change the 
constitution of the city (under the pretense, however, of restoring the patrioi nomoi).  
Why is this more acceptable within a strict interpretation of the nomothetic 
ideology than normal legal change performed by the Assembly? Because the action of 
such a committee can be constructed as parallel to that of the archaic nomothetai: legal 
change is not a matter of ordinary administration of the polis, but is restricted to 
special moments in which plenipotentiary lawgivers (nomothetai or syngrapheis 
autokratores) give (or restore) the laws. Once this process is completed, the laws are 
to become once again unchangeable, as they are in the ‘constitution for the present’. 
Legal change, consistently with the nomothetic tradition, is the province of specially 
appointed nomothetai. And in fact, after the Four Hundred, Thucydides informs us that 
the Five Thousand proceeded to elect nomothetai (8.97.2), presumably for the purpose 
of changing/restoring the nomoi (or implementing the reforms promised by the Four 
Hundred, see Harris 1990; 1997). And in 404 the Thirty themselves were appointed by 
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a decree of Dracontides as a special committee whose task was that of drawing up the 
(ancestral) laws: they acted as nomothetai. In this capacity they proceeded to make 
important changes to the laws of the city. For instance Xen. Hell. 2.3.51 shows us 
Critias, during Theramenes’ trial, mentioning ‘new laws’. Among these there was one 
that forbade the killing of anyone of the Three Thousand without the authorization of 
the Council, but allowed the Thirty to kill freely anyone else they wished (for a 
discussion of the innovation and changes to the laws of the Thirty see Shear 2011: 
172-5). The oligarchs appointed nomothetai, special lawgivers whose task was 
exceptional and time-bound, for the purpose of enacting their constitutional reforms, 
and justified their actions as an attempt to restore and save the city from illegitimate 
legal change performed by the demos in the last century as a matter of day-to-day 
administration, which had resulted (in their opinion) in a general incoherence of the 
laws of the city, and therefore in the breakdown of the rule of law. Their concerns, as 
we have seen, were not far from those of whoever enacted the graphe paranomon, and 
are to be found behind the reforms introduced by democratic governments in the same 
years. Yet ultimately they were aborted, and can be considered as false steps in a 
process of reform that was caused by the city progressively becoming conscious of the 
limits of its dissonant approach to legislation during the fifth century. 
 
6. The revolutionary reforms of the late fifth-century nomothetai 
 
Unlike the reforms attempted by the oligarchs, those that were enacted by 
democratic regimes in the last decade of the fifth century were successful in tackling 
the issues of legal change and innovation (the literature on these reforms is immense, 
see e.g. Kahrstedt 1938, Harrison 1955, Robertson 1990, Rhodes 1991, Carawan 2002, 
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2013, Joyce 2008, Shear 2011: passim, but now see Canevaro-Harris 2012: 110-16). 
They form the basis of the legal system that confronts us in the speeches of the orators 
from the fourth century BCE. Yet these reforms were not enacted in one day, and 
allow us to see an internal development. The most momentous action undertaken by 
the restored democracy in 410 was the republication of the ‘laws of Solon’. The most 
detailed account of this process is found in Lysias’ speech Against Nicomachus (30.2-
5). Although the speech was delivered by an accuser understandably hostile to the 
defendant, many statements in the speech find confirmation in a contemporary 
inscription (IG I3 104) and can be considered reliable. This speech attacks Nicomachus 
in his role as anagrapheus of the nomoi. The verb anagraphein is found in inscriptions 
always in conjunction with ‘on a marble stele’, and means ‘to post’, ‘to publish’. So 
the role of Nicomachus was that of ‘publishing the laws’. Lysias (30.2-3) tells us that 
he was appointed after the restoration of democracy in 410 and was given the task of 
writing up the laws of Solon in four months, yet he stayed in office for six years, and 
never submitted to examination (euthynai) because the city in 404 was defeated by the 
Spartans. After the fall of the Thirty and the restoration of democracy in the 
archonship of Eucleides in 403/2 BCE, Nicomachus was reappointed to this task and 
remained in office for another four years. According to Lysias, Nicomachus received 
bribes to add certain laws and cancel others, so he acted illegitimately as a nomothetes, 
and often he would give litigants opposing laws. The prescript of Draco’s law on 
homicide, republished in 409/8, confirms some details of Lysias’ account, and adds 
some others: 
 
Diognetos of Phrearrhos was Secretary, | Diokles was Archon. | Resolved by the Boule 
and the People, Akamantis held the prytany, [D]io[g]|netos was Secretary, Euthydikos 
presided, [. .]e[. . .] anes made the motion. The || law of Drakon about homicide shall be 
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inscribed by the Recorder|s of the laws (Anagrapheis), after they have received it from the 
King Archon, jointly with the Secretar|y of the Boule, on a marble stele, and they shall set 
it up in front of the Sto|a Basileia. The Poletai shall let the contract according to the la|w. 
The Hellenotamiai shall supply the money. (Trans. Gagarin) 
 
This prescript confirms that anagrapheis of the nomoi were in charge of 
republishing the laws, but corrects the impression given by Lysias that Nicomachus 
acted alone by showing that the anagrapheis were a board. Lysias also claims that 
Nicomachus could cancel and add laws at will, but the inscription shows that all the 
anagrapheis did was to present the texts of the laws to the Assembly, which then 
voted to accept or reject them. Those approved were inscribed on stelae posted in front 
of the Stoa of the King. Andocides’ speech On the Mysteries also provides important 
information about the work of the anagrapheis, although it refers to the second stage 
of the process, after 403. There is however no reason to believe that the task of the 
anagrapheis in their first term (410-404 BCE) was any different form their work in the 
second (403-400 BCE; see Canevaro-Harris 2012: 112). Scholars have usually relied 
on a document preserved in this speech, the decree of Teisamenus (Andoc. 1.83-4), in 
order to reconstruct the procedures followed in the republication of the laws, but this 
document is a later forgery and none of the information can be considered reliable 
(Canevaro-Harris 2012: 110-16). On the other hand, the summary provided by 
Andocides is a rich source of information that is corroborated and supplements the 
account we can reconstruct from Lys. 30 and IG I3 104. Andocides (1.81) states that 
the procedure was an actual examination of laws of Draco and Solon (dokimasantes), 
and that only those that received approval (kyrothentas) should be written up and 
placed in the stoa. So Andocides confirms that the republished laws were posted in 
front of the Stoa of the Basileus, as we learned from the prescript of IG I3 104, and 
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clarifies the approval of the Assembly expressed in the inscription: they were not only 
republished, they were in fact examined and re-approved, and this was the task of the 
Assembly, not of the anagrapheis. 
 This process of examination and republication of the laws of the city raises 
many questions, but also provides answers about the choices and concerns of the 
restored democracy in 410. The first point is that after the attack by the oligarchs 
against the fifth-century tacit legislation of the demos, and their claims to restore the 
patrioi nomoi against the legal changes of the fifth century, the reality of the 
inconsistencies in the laws of Athens was too apparent to be ignored. Moreover, a 
simple return to the previous reality and arrangements was not an option. First, 
because after the changes made by the Four Hundred and the Five Thousand 
democracy had to be effectively restored, which required action. Second because the 
oligarchic revolutions and the ideological justification exploited by the oligarchs had 
shown that democratic institutions were liable to charges of illegitimacy. The 
democrats needed therefore to reclaim first of all the laws of Draco and Solon, the 
patrioi nomoi that the oligarchs claimed to be restoring. Second, they needed to deal 
with the issue of inconsistent legislation, that they had tried to address before with the 
creation of the graphe paranomon. Yet while the graphe paranomon dealt with 
prospective legislation, they had to deal with the problem retroactively, restoring the 
coherent system of laws that was implicit in their ideology of legislation since the 
recognition of Solon as the father of the legal order, while at the same time restating 
the right of the demos to rule.  
Their solution was conservative and innovative at the same time. Conservative 
because, once again, they did not introduce any rules of change, nor did they install 
nomothetai to write new laws and change the constitution for the better. They chose 
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instead to restore the ‘laws of Solon’ (according to Lys. 30.2), and it is possible that 
originally the task of the anagrapheis was believed to be simply that of finding the 
actual laws of Solon (which were presumably at the time still readable on axones) and 
republishing them in the most visible fashion, at a key point in the agora, the central 
civic setting of the city, in front of the Stoa of the King, on free-standing stelae in an 
impressive monumental arrangement (for the physical characteristics of the 
republished laws see Shear 2011: 85-96), in order to reclaim them for the democracy.  
Lysias (30.2) remarks that Nicomachus was originally appointed to perform 
the task in four months, but stayed in office for six years. This may reflect 
expectations in the city that the task would have been straightforward, the laws would 
have been found, recognized unequivocally in a short time and promptly republished. 
But this proved to be unrealistic, because, as we have seen, the situation of the laws of 
the city, after over a century of tacit legal change and unrecognized innovations, was 
very inconsistent and much more complex than expected. In particular, the Athenians 
(and specifically the anagrapheis) might have already realized that simply 
republishing the actual laws of Solon would have brought the city back to a 
constitutional form that was very different from the arrangements before the oligarchic 
revolution. So in practice the task had to be understood in a wider sense as pertaining 
to the republication of the laws of the city in general, to decide what was to be valid 
and what was not (on this issue see Clinton 1982, Rhodes 1991, Shear 2011: 75-9), 
and this is why Nicomachus could be accused of adding some laws and deleting 
others.  
This seems to be confirmed by the extant fragments of the republished stelae, 
which contain among other fragments Draco’s law on homicide (IG I3 104), a 
composite dossier of laws concerning the Council, presumably from different times 
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(IG I3 105), and a naval law concerning equipment of triremes and the obligations of 
trierarchs towards their successors (IG I3 236) which cannot be earlier than the fifth 
century (on these fragments cf. Dow 1961, Lambert 2002, Shear 2011: 75-96). This is 
where the process of republication adopts innovative solutions: the Athenians, by 
republishing these laws, not only recognized statutes from various times as potentially 
valid, and to some extent, for the first time, differentiated between permanent rules, 
nomoi that were to be republished, and ad hoc measures, but created a procedure, 
although a temporary one, for dealing with inconsistencies among the laws, one that 
involved an assessment by the Assembly of all laws (entrenched or not, Solonian or 
not) and a final decision of the demos on all of them. Thus, a process that was intended 
to restore the patrioi nomoi ended up with a full series of stelae inscribed with ancient 
and less ancient laws, some Solonian and Draconian, which were introduced by 
prescripts that, like in IG I3 104, declared that the demos had approved them. While 
reaffirming the authority of (most) ancient laws of the city, and repealing some others 
as inconsistent, the Athenians for the first time explicitly recognized that even the laws 
of Solon and Draco derived their authority not from an oath or an entrenchment 
clause, but from the vote of the demos. This was a momentous event, which would 
mark the development of legislative procedures in Athens in a democratic direction, 
despite the fact that the whole process was still intended as temporary, and did not 
provide any explicit rule of change for the future. 
The Athenians restored democracy once again in 403, in the archonship of 
Eucleides, and they swore not to remember past wrongs (me mnesikakakein, an 
amnesty extended to all but the Thirty themselves and those who had held office under 
them, whose terms are summarized at [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 39.5; cf. recently Joyce 2008; 
2014). At that time, we learn from Andocides, they also resumed the process of 
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republishing their laws and brought it eventually to completion. Yet in addition to 
continuing with the republication of the laws of Draco and Solon, they elected 
nomothetai, and their election brought about extensive changes in the Athenian legal 
order, among which a clear-cut distinction between nomoi and psephismata and 
precise and comprehensive rules of changes that allowed the laws to be amended at 
any point. It is important to follow the events of those years carefully. Andocides 
(1.81) recalls that after the war between the oligarchs and the democrats ended with 
the reconciliation agreement, the Athenians elected a commission of twenty to govern 
the city until laws could be enacted, but until then, the thesmoi of Draco and the nomoi 
of Solon had to be valid.  
It is remarkable that Andocides chooses to use the word thesmoi, the original 
term that defined the laws of the archaic lawgivers. This may indicate that after the 
extensive changes the Thirty had brought about, and because, as we have seen, they 
actively destroyed many laws (such as those of Ephialtes and Archestratus), in order to 
restore some appearance of legal order the Athenians chose to declare temporarily 
valid only the original laws of Draco and Solon, which had presumably remained 
mostly untouched. This would also justify why they felt the need to enact ‘new laws’, 
as Andocides states: they could not simply go back to the status quo before the Thirty. 
Eventually, members of the Council were selected by lot, and the Assembly elected 
nomothetai. Afterwards the Athenians voted to resume the scrutiny of the laws of 
Draco and Solon started in 410. We are here faced with two separate procedures: one 
resumes the work of republication of the anagrapheis, but the other is the election of 
nomothetai for the explicit purpose of enacting new laws. The format is the usual one, 
familiar from the nomothetic tradition and the oligarchic revolutions: the most 
legitimate means to make new laws and modify the constitution is by appointing 
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special lawgivers which would perform this special task, after which the new laws 
should not be changed. However, this is the first time we find the democracy using 
this instrument (the restored democracy in 410 did not appoint nomothetai, it simply 
proceeded to republish the ancestral laws), and the outcome is different from anything 
we have seen before. Why were these nomothetai appointed? First of all, as we have 
mentioned, to remedy the destruction caused by the Thirty and make it possible to 
revive the laws of the city in a fashion that would make them workable. Second, 
because it is likely that many of the existing laws that the anagrapheis were about to 
post once again in front of the Stoa of the King would have made the reconciliation 
agreement invalid, and brought to justice many for their actions under the Thirty, who 
were instead to be pardoned under the me mnesikakein rule. In fact, most of the new 
laws that we know these nomothetai to have enacted have to do with these two 
aspects: rules about legislation, and the validity of laws before and after the archonship 
of Eucleides. In enacting these laws, the nomothetai revolutionized legislation in 
Athens. 
Andocides (1.85-9) discusses the laws that were laid down by these 
nomothetai. One of these laws, ordering that ‘all judgments in private suits and in 
arbitrations rendered during the democracy are to be valid’, provides that only 
judgments and arbitrations rendered under a democratic regime are to be valid, but 
not those rendered under the Thirty. The same law is discussed by Demosthenes 
(Dem. 24.56-7) and is supplemented by a further clause that explicitly states ‘but what 
was done under the Thirty, or the judgment[s] delivered, whether in private or in 
public, shall be invalid.’ Andocides mentions another law, which provides that ‘laws 
are to be enforced from the archonship of Eucleides’. The meaning of this provision is 
not, as has been sometimes argued, that only laws enacted from the archonship of 
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Eucleides are to be valid, but rather that the laws cannot be applied to any crime 
committed before the archonship of Eucleides (see MacDowell 1962: 128-9). This 
provision was clearly meant to make the reconciliation agreement enforceable, by 
forbidding any case originating in a wrong committed before 403 to be brought to 
trial. These few laws deal therefore with the transition from the regime of the Thirty 
to democracy.  
The other laws mentioned by Andocides deal instead with legislation, and are 
more interesting in this context. The first he mentions is a provision stating that ‘it is 
not allowed for magistrates to use an unwritten (agraphos) nomos not even about a 
single matter’. This provision is sometimes believed to refer to laws that are not 
republished by the anagrapheis, but the opposite of agraphos (as Clinton 1982: 34 
correctly points out) is gegrammenos (‘written’), not anagegrammenos (‘posted’, 
‘published’, ‘inscribed’). This should be interpreted as a basic rule to be respected in 
the city: magistrates should perform their task adhering strictly to the instructions of 
the written laws, and not according to customs, or to any principle that is not 
explicitly included in the laws of the city. The very enactment of such a law by the 
nomothetai is evidence that they undertook an unprecedented task, that of defining 
once and for all, from the basics, what are the laws that are to rule the city. Another 
provision preserved in Andocides is also key in this respect: ‘no decree, neither of the 
Council nor of the Assembly, is to have more authority than a law’. This law for the 
first time introduces a clear-cut distinction between nomoi and psephismata, and a 
hierarchy between the two, with nomoi being rules of a higher level, which can 
overrule decrees but cannot be overruled by them. This rule effectively put an end to 
the interchangeable use of nomos and psephisma that we have remarked for the fifth 
century, and two pioneering essays by Hansen (1978 and 1979) have demonstrated 
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that the Athenians throughout the fourth century respected this subdivision and this 
hierarchy carefully (see below Section 7 for the procedural distinction between the 
two).  
But what is a nomos? Fourth-century philosophers are very clear about this: 
Aristotle in the Politics (1292a32-7) points out that laws ought to determine all 
general matters while magistrates deal with particular cases. In the Nicomachean 
Ethics (1137b13-14) he also states that a law must be put in general terms, and that is 
why cities also require decrees, which must deal with particular cases. That a law 
must be general in scope seems to be its key element, and the next law quoted by 
Andocides (1.89; cf. also Dem. 23.86, 218; 24.18, 59, 116, 188; [Dem.] 46.2) rules 
exactly this, although in negative terms: ‘It is not permitted to enact a law directed 
against an individual unless the same law applies to all Athenians’ (cf. Canevaro-
Harris 2012: 117-19 and Canevaro 2013: 145-150). The nomothetai defined what a 
nomos, as opposed to a psephisma, is by forbidding laws for single individuals: laws 
must have a general content and apply to all Athenians alike. The author of the 
Pseudo-Platonic Definitions (415b) remarks instead that a law must be valid not for a 
limited time, but forever. This principle reminds us of the nomothetic tradition of 
legislation, with its focus on the unchangeability of the law and its permanent validity. 
There is no provision in the extant laws of the nomothetai which states this explicitly, 
although Hansen (1978 and 1979) has shown that in practice fourth-century Athenians 
stuck also to this rule.  
Another law that is likely to belong to the legislative activity of the nomothetai 
of 403 deals on the other hand with time, and provides further directions as to the 
validity of the nomoi. This is the law of Diocles, found as a (reliable) document at 
Dem. 24.42 (Canevaro 2013: 121-7): 
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Diocles said: the laws enacted before the archonship of Eucleides under the democracy 
and those that were enacted in the archonship of Eucleides and have been written up shall 
be in force. Those enacted after the archonship of Eucleides and enacted henceforth shall 
be in effect from the day in which each was enacted, except if the time from which one 
must be in effect is specified. The secretary shall add this provision to the laws now in 
effect within thirty days; henceforth, whoever happens to be the secretary, shall 
immediately add that the law is in effect from the day in which it was enacted. 
 
This law defines the time from which particular laws are to be in force. Those 
enacted before the archonship of Eucleides under the democracy are simply to be in 
force (the date from which they can be enforced is not an issue, because no laws can 
be applied to crimes committed before the archonship of Eucleides). The laws 
anagegrammenoi passed in the archonship of Eucleides must also be simply valid, 
without a starting point. This must reflect the fact that the anagrapheis were simply 
republishing laws (confirmed by the Assembly) that were already in force before their 
republication, so even if they were republished at a specific point during the 
archonship of Eucleides, they must be considered in force from beforehand. Finally, 
any new law passed afterward is to be valid from the day of the enactment (unless the 
law itself provides for a later starting point). So the law provides that laws cannot be 
retroactive, and does not assume or mention any time limit in the future. This implies, 
although it does not state, that laws are supposed to be permanently valid. 
  
7. The introduction of rules of change: the new nomothesia 
 
Thus the revolutionary action of the nomothetai of 403 gave Athens a clear-cut 
 44 
distinction between nomoi and psephismata, eventually embodying in a set of rules 
the distinction between legislation and day-to-day administration that was implicit in 
the nomothetic tradition from the beginning. They also provided a clear hierarchy 
which defined nomoi as a higher set of rules that have precedence over psephismata. 
Moreover, the very fact that these specially appointed nomothetai found it necessary 
to make innovations and changes in the law shows that by now the Athenians had 
come to understand that legal change is necessary, and must be institutionalized. The 
republication of the laws of Solon had institutionalized to an extent innovation in 
legislation, by accepting laws passed after the archaic lawgivers and by submitting the 
ancestral laws of the city to the scrutiny of the demos. Now the nomothetai, although 
still formally within the nomothetic tradition (they were after all a specially appointed 
committee for the purpose of constitutional reform), would proceed to institutionalize 
legal change, by providing the city with comprehensive rules of change that made it 
possible for the demos to give itself laws, and change previous laws, without 
disruption of the legal order, but through a precise and completely legitimate 
procedure (there is wide agreement among scholars that the introduction of the rules 
of nomothesia valid in the fourth century must be attributed to the 403 nomothetai; 
see e.g. Harrison 1955: 26, Hansen 1991: 164; Kremmydas 2012: 24). Through these 
procedures the distinction between nomoi and psephismata was further 
institutionalized, with different paths to enact and repeal decrees and laws. 
 The evidence for the procedures of legislation that were enacted by the 
nomothetai of 403 and were used throughout the fourth century until 322 is extensive, 
yet very hard to decipher. The main evidence for this procedure is found in two 
speeches by Demosthenes, both delivered in the 350s: the Against Leptines (20) and 
the Against Timocrates (24), supplemented by a short passage of Aeschines’ Against 
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Ctesiphon (3.38.40), which provides information about a later addition to the 
procedures aimed at fine-tuning its workings. Some further information is provided 
by a few fourth-century inscriptions, laws and decrees that provide for the enactment 
of laws (SEG 26.72; Stroud 1998; Agora Excavations, inv. no. I 7495 (unpublished); 
IG II2 140; IG II2 244; IG II3 320; IG II3 447; IG II3 445; IEleusis 138; SEG 52.104; 
IG II3 452, IG II3 327, IG II3 355). Dem. 20 and 24 both discuss extensively the laws 
concerning the enactment of new laws, and Dem. 24 also preserves documents that 
purport to contain the actual laws about legislation. Yet these documents are 
inconsistent with the accounts in the speeches, and have many unacceptable features 
that show that they are forgeries inserted in the speech at a later date (Canevaro 
2013b; pace MacDowell 1975; Hansen 1978-9; Rhodes 1984; Hansen 1985, who use 
these documents in their reconstructions). The reconstruction I provide here does not 
rely on the forged documents and has the advantage of representing a coherent 
procedure that is supported by all the remaining evidence (for a full case for this 
reconstruction see Canevaro 2013b).  
 There is however a gap in my reconstruction, which I should flag up before 
summarizing it here: the identity of the nomothetai. These are obviously not the same 
as the ones that enacted this procedure, but rather, as we shall see, nomothetai that 
could be appointed at any point, whenever someone decided to initiate legislation. 
Scholars have for a long time believed, on the evidence of the forged document at 
Dem. 24.20-3, that the nomothetai were selected from among those who had taken the 
Judicial Oath, that is from the same pool of men as the judges in the lawcourts. With 
the recognition that this document is not reliable, we are left with two passages that 
could give information about the identity of the nomothetai: one is Dem. 20.93, which 
mentions those that have sworn the oath, but is unclear as to whether these are the 
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nomothetai enacting new laws, or rather the judges that repeal opposing ones (see 
Canevaro, forthcoming a); the other passage is Aeschin. 3.39, which seems to mean 
‘the prytaneis shall hold an Assembly labeling (epigraphein) it nomothetai’ and 
therefore to be evidence that the nomothetai were in fact a special session of the 
Asssembly (Piérart 2000; contra Rhodes believes that epigraphein could also be a 
way of saying ‘putting nomothetai on the agenda’). The evidence is too scanty for a 
final word, and I prefer here to suspend my judgment. I provide now a summary of 
my findings, which should shed light on the momentous innovations introduced by 
the nomothetai elected in 403. 
The procedure they created worked as follows: 1) in order to introduce a new 
law, a probouleuma (a preliminary decision; cf. Rhodes OHAGL) had to be approved 
by the Council, introducing a vote in the Assembly about whether new laws could be 
proposed; 2) following the probouleuma, a preliminary vote in the Assembly, at any 
point of the year, had to be held that would allow new laws to be proposed (Dem. 
24.25; IG II2 333, IG II3 320, IG II2 140); 3) once new proposals had been authorized 
by the Assembly, all new proposals had to be posted in front of the monument of the 
Eponymous Heroes (Dem. 24.25; 20.94), so that anybody could see them (the 
monument of the eponymous heroes was a series of statues in the Agora representing 
the eponymous heroes of the ten Athenian tribes, which served as a public board of 
the Athenian state); 4) the bills had to be read out by the secretary in each Assembly 
until the appointment of the nomothetai, to allow everyone to make up their minds 
(Dem. 20.94); 5) in the third Assembly after the preliminary vote, on the basis of the 
proposals submitted, the people had to discuss the appointment (or summons) of 
nomothetai and pass a decree of appointment (or summons; Dem. 24.25; 20.92); 6) 
opposing laws however had to be repealed before the new laws could be enacted by 
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the nomothetai (Dem. 24.32, 34–5; Dem. 20.93); Dem. 20.93 (and passim) suggests 
that the correct forum for repealing opposing laws was a lawcourt (see Canevaro, 
forthcoming a); 7) presumably at the same meeting of the Assembly that appointed 
the nomothetai, expert synegoroi were elected to defend those laws whose repeal was 
necessary for enacting the new laws (Dem. 24.36; 20.146); 8) if the proposer of a new 
law failed to abide by any of these provisions, anyone could bring him to trial through 
a graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai (a public charge for enacting an inexpedient 
law; Dem. 24.32), and if the case was heard within a year after the enactment of the 
law, the punishment could be anything the court decides, from a small fine to atimia 
or death. 
The creation of the new distinction between laws and decrees, of the new 
procedure of nomothesia, and of the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai (the public 
action against inexpedient laws) to be used to repeal nomoi, also changed the scope of 
the old graphe paranomon. The two procedures were superficially similar, and the 
graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai followed the same procedure as we have 
described in Section 5 for the graphe paranomon. Yet with the introduction of the 
distinction between nomoi and psephismata the graphe paranomon partially changed 
its role, and could no longer be used against any enactment, but only against decrees. 
Conversely the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai was reserved for nomoi, and 
could presumably be used both against laws just enacted or proposed (in which case, 
if the case came to court within a year, the proposer was liable to punishment), or to 
repeal older laws before enacting a new one before the nomothetai (cf Dem. 20.93 
and in general the situation in the speech; see Canevaro, forthcoming a; contra 
Hansen 1978-9; Rhodes 1984; Hansen 1985), in which case the law was defended by 
synegoroi (or syndikoi) elected by the Assembly. Despite the different names of the 
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two public charges, which seem to suggest for the first a focus on legal matters 
(whether a decree is against the laws) and for the second a focus on matters of 
political interest (to sympheron) more akin to those treated in a deliberative setting, 
studies of the arguments used in both kinds of charge have shown that the 
terminology was purely intended to distinguish the two procedures from one another, 
yet nomoi are often accused of paranomia (illegality), and the scope of a graphe 
paranomon often is not limited to the strict inconsistency with existing laws, and 
touches also on questions of political interest (cf. Quass 1971: 27; Rubinstein 2000: 
42-3 n. 48; Kremmydas 2012: 49; this is not to say that the only relevant 
considerations in cases of graphe paranomon were political, and the action was meant 
to be used as an instrument of political feuding, pace Yunis 1988). The term 
epitedeios (inexpedient) itself seems to have in graphai nomon me epitedeion theinai 
a semantic range that covers anything from ‘unsuitable’ and ‘inexpedient’ to 
‘unconstitutional’ (cf. LSJ s.v.: ‘that does not fit’). And in fact, the sources show that 
in both instances the plaint presented by the accuser in bringing the charge (cf. Harris 
2013b: 114-27, Canevaro, forthcoming a and Canevaro OHAGL on legal procedure) 
had to quote the actual laws that the new bill contradicted (cf. Harris 2013a: 121-2). 
The two terms (paranomon and epitedeion) therefore do not mark a distinction in 
terms of argumentative focus, but rather flag up a substantive difference between the 
two charges: graphai paranomon indict psephismata that are inconsistent with the 
nomoi, while graphai nomon epitedeion theinai indict nomoi that are inconsistent 
with other nomoi and therefore endanger the coherence of the legal order as a whole 
(or nomoi that are going to be inconsistent with other nomoi once these are enacted by 
the nomothetai). 
 Upon examining these complex procedures, it is immediately clear that they 
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do not make enacting new laws, or changing existing ones, very easy. They require 
many procedural steps, before the Council, the Assembly, the lawcourts and finally 
the nomothetai, and set a very clear timetable. Yet these hurdles are not more 
complex or time-consuming than those set by modern constitutions for the enactment 
of laws, let alone constitutional laws, and do not seem to be conceived to discourage 
legislation, but simply to regulate it. These rules are veritable rules of change that 
provide any Athenian who wishes with a clear procedure for enacting or changing 
legislation. In sections 4 and 5 we summarized the various options advocated in 
Athens for solving the issues caused by the dissonant system of legislation of the fifth 
century. We isolated a conservative option: only the laws founded on the authority of 
specially appointed lawgivers are valid and legitimate, and no legal change is 
allowed; a middle-ground option: enactments of the demos are valid, as long as they 
do not contradict ancestral laws, any entrenched enactment, and any other enactment 
that has not been repealed in advance, yet no change of the ancestral laws and 
entrenched enactments is allowed; and finally an extreme option, which one could 
connect with extreme democrats: in the words of Pericles (Xen. Mem. 1.2.42), ‘Laws 
are all the rules approved and enacted by the majority in assembly, whereby they 
declare what ought and what ought not to be done’. For most of the late fifth century 
the solutions pursued were the first or the second: oligarchs tried to enforce through 
revolution the absolute unchangeability of the ancestral laws, and rejected the 
legitimacy of anything else, while democrats, with the graphe paranomon and the 
republication of the laws of 410-404, accepted the validity of the enactments of the 
demos, but refused to allow and institutionalize legal change, and actively 
discouraged it with the graphe paranomon. It is then all the more remarkable that the 
solution chosen by the nomothetai appointed in 403 is in fact the extreme one, 
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because the creation of such rules of change gives any Athenian who wishes the right 
to propose or amend a law at any point, and have his proposal assessed by his fellow 
citizens (whether the nomothetai were judges, a special Assembly or a committee 
appointed for the purpose of enacting laws, they were still an ordinary group of 
Athenians acting on the authority of the demos). Before this date there was no 
legitimate way to change a law of the city; laws were believed to be unchangeable.  
The existence of tacit legal change despite the rules and ideology of legislation does 
not change this basic fact, and one should moreover consider the many attempts 
democrats and oligarchs made in the fifth century to discourage it and prevent it. It is 
therefore all the more paradoxical that the introduction of rules of change in Athens 
has been interpreted by many historians, as we have seen in Section 1, as a limitation 
of the sovereignty of the people, when it is in fact the first time in which the right of 
the demos to introduce new laws and change old ones is explicitly recognized, 
institutionalized and regulated. 
 Yet, however revolutionary the reform of legislation introduced by the 
nomothetai of 403 is, it was not a complete break from the nomothetic tradition of 
legislation which originated with Solon and the Athenian understanding of his action. 
Solon had attempted to separate legislation from administration but had not devised a 
democratic procedure for altering or revising his laws. The reforms of 403 retained 
his distinction between administration and legislation by creating different procedures 
for enacting decrees (psephismata) about public business and laws (nomoi) but 
provided a democratic procedure for altering laws in an orderly fashion. We should 
explain this institutional change as a development that is, to use the terminology of 
New Institutionalism, path-dependent, and is influenced by previous institutional and 
ideological arrangements. Even while rejecting the two principles, key to that 
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tradition, that laws are unchangeable and that legislation is not the province of the 
demos, the Athenians still managed to salvage much of the tradition that expressed 
those principles. The new revolutionary arrangement incorporates many of the 
concerns that that tradition expressed. In particular, although making and changing 
laws is now possible at any point of the year, laws do not merge with the ordinary 
business of the Assembly. The very distinction between nomoi and psephismata is 
predicated on the principle that laws are different from administration, the very 
principle that in its most inflexible formulation is rejected with the creation of the new 
nomothesia. Likewise, the many institutional stages one has to go through in order to 
pass legislation are designed to prevent ‘frivolous’ legislation, that is the enactment of 
inexpedient laws on the spur of the moment by an emotional Assembly. These 
hurdles, and the requirement that one should repeal opposing laws before enacting a 
new one, or else be liable to a dangerous graphe nomon epitedeion theinai, and the 
availability of further judicial review for enacted nomoi, are moreover designed to 
preserve the coherence of the laws of the city. Far from limiting the power of the 
Assembly, the new rules enabled the Assembly to speak with one clear voice, not a 
cacophony of inconsistent rules. Average citizens could only understand their rights 
and duties if the Assembly gave them a comprehensive and coherent set of 
instructions (Dem. 20.90-93). Avoiding the existence of inconsistent laws at the same 
time is important to secure predictability for the litigants, but this concern for the 
internal coherence of the laws of the city is not new: it springs directly from the 
understanding of the laws of the city as a unitary whole which reflects the rational 
intention of an original lawgiver. This principle, opportunely modified, is also 
incorporated into the new institution. The nomothesia created after the restoration of 
democracy in 403 and in force in the fourth century is the result of the interplay 
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between revolutionary choices and beliefs like the full sovereignty of the demos and 
old concerns typical of a tradition of legislation which dates back over 200 years.  
 
8. Legislation in the fourth century 
 
The Athenians during the fourth century stuck to the rules of change created in 
the aftermath of the democratic restoration to an impressive extent. In a 1978 article 
Hansen has surveyed all the extant decrees of the Assembly and found no examples of 
general rules valid forever, nomoi according to the distinction introduced at the end of 
the fifth century, which were enacted by the Council or the Assembly (the only 
possible exceptions are dated to the years 340-38, right before and after the battle of 
Chaeronea, when Athens was in danger of defeat and destruction, and therefore 
correct procedure was occasionally dropped when emergency measures were 
necessary). Hansen surveyed some 500 psephismata of the Assembly preserved 
epigraphically, and could not find any examples of rules that should have been passed 
as nomoi before 322. Conversely, he discussed six nomoi, and none of these was 
passed by the Assembly. The distinction is in the very motion and enactment formulas 
of the enactments: while the psephismata are introduced by formulas such as ‘it was 
resolved / it should be resolved by the people / by the Council’ (edoxe / dedochthai toi 
demoi / tei boulei), nomoi never make any reference to the Assembly or the Council, 
but either state that the enactment is a nomos, or have formulas such as ‘it was 
resolved / it should be resolved by the nomothetai (edoxe / dedochthai tois 
nomothetais).  
We now have ten fourth-century laws on stone from Athens, and all conform 
to this description (SEG 26.72; Stroud 1998; Agora Excavations, inv. no. I 7495 
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(unpublished); IG II2 140; IG II2 244; IG II3 320; IG II3 447; IG II3 445; IEleusis 138; 
to these one should add SEG 52.104 = Themelis 2002, which has been sometimes 
dated to the third century, but should be dated instead to the second half of the fourth, 
cf. Canevaro 2013c; and the document at Dem. 24.63, which is a reliable document 
preserving a law enacted by nomothetai, cf. Canevaro 2013: 151-7). The only 
apparent exceptions to this rule are three honorary decrees of the Assembly (IG IG II3 
452, IG II3 327, IG II3 355, cf. also Dem. 24.27 with Canevaro 2013: 104-13) that 
order that certain sums for the purpose of funding particular honours should be 
assigned to a particular treasurer at the next session of the nomothetai. In such cases it 
is clear that the enactment that the nomothetai would be required to pass was not a 
general rule valid forever, so at first sight would have been more appropriately passed 
as a decree. Yet the rationale for such cases is clear: the allocation of the funds of the 
city, the budget, was a fixed one in Athens, regulated by the merismos, which was a 
permanent law, not a decree. If any change to the merismos was required to free or 
reassign particular sums, in accordance with the rule that no psephismata could take 
precedence over a nomos, the only option open to the Athenians was to change the 
nomos about the merismos. So this apparent infraction of the rules established at the 
end of the fifth century is rather a good case of strict conformity to those rules. 
Permanent rules of general scope were indeed enacted in the fourth century by regular 
meetings of the nomothetai, and not by normal Assembly meetings, and the evidence 
of inscriptions shows that the distinction between nomoi and psephismata was upheld. 
It also appears that the multiple hurdles did discourage frivolous legislation, as 
we have around 500 extant decrees on stone but, as we have seen, only around ten 
nomoi. These data however should not be interpreted as evidence that the procedure 
did in fact discourage legislation altogether (pace Hansen 1974: 46-7). It is perfectly 
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normal that new general permanent rules should be necessary much less often than 
decrees dealing with the day-to-day administration of the polis. And we should also 
account for the influence of the epigraphic habit on the publication of laws and 
decrees on stone, because we know that not everything was inscribed (cf. Sickinger 
1998). The very high number of extant decrees results from the fact that all honorary 
decrees were usually published, and these form the majority of psephismata in our 
records. Dem. 24.142, admittedly in a passage in which he is accusing the Athenians 
of legislating too much, states that they did so almost once a prytany, that is, almost 
ten times a year. Allowing for rhetorical exaggeration, we could perhaps halve this 
figure, but we would still be left with five sessions of nomothetai a year, each of 
which could and presumably did deal with multiple legislation proposals. It is easy to 
see how someone arguing for repealing new laws could represent this as an excessive 
amount of legislation. Apart from inscriptions, our main evidence for legislative 
procedures in the fourth century is provided by speeches delivered in graphai 
paranomon and graphai nomon me epitedeion theinai. In our sources we find mention 
of 35 graphai paranomon (Hansen 1991: 208 gives this figure, which corrects the 
previous catalogue, Hansen 1974, which reported 39 cases), against only six graphai 
nomon me epitedeion theinai. This seems to confirm the impression given by 
inscriptions that psephismata were much more numerous than nomoi, yet it should be 
pointed out (pace Hansen 1991: 176) that the ratio is much less extreme: 10 against 
almost 500 in inscriptions (one in fifty), 6 against 39 in literary sources 
(approximately one in six). This may suggest that laws were enacted and changed 
more usually than inscriptions suggest, and at the same time, that they were more 
promptly indicted after their enactment. 
 Of course, procedural infractions happened, and gave rise to abundant 
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criticism, which sometimes resembled in its arguments the objections against legal 
change tout court usual in the fifth century. The most notable case we know of is that 
about the law of Timocrates: this new law, introduced in 354/3, allowed public 
debtors who failed to pay back their debt in time to avoid prison if they could present 
sureties. Against this law, which had just been enacted, a certain Diodorus (whose 
speech was written by Demosthenes, Dem. 24) immediately brought a graphe nomon 
me epitedeion theinai. According to Diodorus’ speech, Timocrates enacted this law 
for the sole purpose of saving Androtion, a famous politician and an associate of 
Timocrates, from imprisonment. In enacting the law, he did not respect the prescribed 
times for legislating: he was authorized by the Assembly to propose legislation, and 
forced the appointment of the nomothetai to the very next day (instead of waiting for 
the third meeting of the Assembly, see above Section 7), at which meeting the law 
was approved. Diodorus has documents read out to support his charge, so this is likely 
to be true, yet we should note that because of these infractions Timocrates was liable 
to a public charge, which was immediately brought against him. We do not know how 
the trial ended, but it is evidence that the multiple checks of legislation worked.  
In the speech Against Leptines (20.91-2), for another graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai brought in 355/4 by Apsephion, Phormion and Demosthenes 
against a law that made most tax-exemptions illegal, Demosthenes refers to the rules 
of change discussed at Section 7 as ‘the old law’, from which Leptines has deviated in 
enacting his law. He claims that when these rules (which he anachronistically 
attributes to Solon) were followed, people used the existing laws and did not enact 
new ones, whereas now some politicians, who have acquired great power, manage to 
legislate however they want. As a result, there are plenty of contradictory laws and 
laws resemble decrees, and are in fact often more recent than the decrees to which 
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they should conform. Diodorus at Dem. 24.142 also speaks along these lines when he 
claims that rhetores legislate almost every month, and they repeal the laws of Solon, 
which were enacted by the ancestors, and replace them with their own. These 
statements have been too often taken at face value (see e.g. Kahrstedt 1938: 12-18; 
Harrison 1955: 26-35; Ehrenberg 1960: 57), but we should keep in mind that they all 
come from speeches delivered for the purpose of repealing new laws as not 
epitedeious (expedient). 
In the Against Leptines Demosthenes exaggerates when he argues that, as long 
as the Athenians followed the rules of change laid down after the restoration of 
democracy in 403, they did not enact new laws. We have in fact epigraphical 
evidence of laws enacted by the nomothetai before 355. Likewise, when he claims 
that in his time rhetores manage to legislate however they want to, he is not referring 
to actual reforms of nomothesia (which would have abolished what he calls ‘the old 
law’), but simply to bad practices. Against his account goes the very fact that 
Leptines’ law had indeed been enacted by the nomothetai according to the old law, as 
Demosthenes has to admit (20.94), and moreover the result of the trial, which 
repealed Leptines’ law, is evidence that if procedural violations occurred, the decision 
of the nomothetai was actually later reversed in court (see Harris 2008: 20-1 and 
Kremmydas 2012: 58-69). The accusation that laws are merging into decrees is also 
not supported by the epigraphical evidence, which shows that they were clearly 
distinguished all the way down to 322, and by the fact that Leptines’ law itself was 
approved by the nomothetai, and was certainly a permanent general rule, as was the 
law of Timocrates (despite Diodorus’ claim that its real intention was to save 
Androtion).  
As for Diodorus’ accusations in the Against Timocrates that the Athenians 
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legislated too much, the epigraphical and literary evidence shows that they passed far 
fewer laws than decrees. Of course, they did legislate, and the new laws could still be 
represented when needed as too many, and the nomothetic ideology (which to an 
extent was still alive and underlined the new practices) provided the orators with 
abundant material against new laws just enacted that could come in handy in the new 
institutional context. And yet what should be stressed are the differences: Diodorus 
complains that the laws of the ancestors are repealed all the time, yet he never claims 
that this is illegitimate. In fact, he is witness to the fact that legal change does 
legitimately happen. He just claims that excessive legal change is undesirable, in the 
same way as Demosthenes does in the Against Leptines. These passages employ 
argumentative strategies that bear a resemblance to fifth-century arguments 
delegitimizing legal change, but they are mainly instrumental, and should be read in 
their particular rhetorical contexts. They are moreover countered by opposing claims 
in the orators that praise the procedure of legislation and the level of adherence to the 
laws (cf. Aeschin. 1.177-8, [Dem.] 25.20-4, Lyc. 1.4). As Hansen points out (1991: 
177), ‘our picture of [fourth-century] nomothesia in Athens would certainly be very 
different if it were the defence speeches that had come down to us and the 
prosecution’s speeches that were lost’. We would have in that case litigants 
vindicating the necessity and desirability of the particular legal change they are 
proposing, in a fashion that was unknown in the fifth century outside theoretical 
reflections. 
 But one theme is repeatedly stressed in the extant speeches for charges 
brought under the public procedure against inexpedient laws (graphe nomon me 
epitedeion theinai), and on which Demosthenes always concentrates much more 
extensively than on the undesirability of excessive legal change: the need for 
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preserving the coherence of the laws of the city. He argues that various provisions of 
the laws he indicts are inconsistent with previous laws that the defendant failed to 
repeal, and often argues more widely that the law is unacceptable because it betrays 
the overall spirit of Athenian laws, predicated on the intention and rationality of the 
lawgiver (Harris 2007: 365-7). This concern is so central in our sources that we can 
confidently assume that the same focus would have been expressed in defence 
speeches for new laws, on the grounds that the new law is in fact consistent with the 
laws of the city. And this concern about the existence of inconsistent laws, as is 
expressed by Diodorus (at Dem. 24.142), should be taken seriously, because despite 
all the checks and hurdles imposed on legislation, the fourth-century nomothesia 
procedure that we have described had the final stage, the judicial review of the new 
law, still dependent on the willingness of volunteers, which must have made it less 
than perfectly effective. In fact, that this was not simply an instrumental argument 
used by the orators in prosecution speeches is demonstrated by the fact that we have 
evidence of institutional innovations aimed at solving exactly this issue. Demosthenes 
(20.91) mentions that commissioners were elected specifically to inspect the existing 
laws and find contradictions, and Aeschines (3.38-9), around twenty-five years later, 
mentions the same task as one entrusted to the thesmothetai (it is unclear whether the 
task was transferred to them at some point, as MacDowell 1975: 72 and Rhodes 1984: 
60 believe, or commissioners and thesmothetai worked together, as Hansen 1985: 356 
believes). The same concern is attested epigraphically: the law of Nicophon (SEG 
26.72, l. 55–6) shows that the texts of contradictory laws were destroyed when a new 
law was enacted. 
 Despite all these checks however, and as Demosthenes correctly (yet 
excessively) remarks, it is a fact that in the fourth century laws could be enacted by 
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anybody at any time, pending the approval of his fellow citizens. Legal change 
happened several times every year; it was fully legitimate and institutionalized; and it 
was within the powers of the demos. It is therefore understandable that Aristotle 
should consider fourth-century Athenian democracy as the most extreme form of 
democracy (Arist. Pol. 1298b13-15), one in which the demos is master over the laws. 
His remark at 1292a1-7 that in an extreme democracy (and Athens is for Aristotle an 
extreme democracy), as the plethos and not the laws are sovereign, decrees have 
higher validity than laws, does not describe fairly the Athenian institutional 
arrangement. Yet it reflects criticism of legislative practices (and of their use by 
rhetores) that are detectable also in Demosthenes (e.g. Dem. 20.92). Such a point of 
view is predicated on the belief, which Aristotle makes clear at 1269a12–a20 (cf. also 
Pl. Pol. 297e), that: 
 
[…] even some of the written laws may with advantage not be left unaltered. For just as 
in the other arts as well, so with the structure of the state it is impossible that it should 
have been framed aright in all its details; for it must of necessity be couched in general 
terms, but our actions deal with particular things. These considerations therefore make it 
clear that it is proper for some laws sometimes to be altered. But if we consider the matter 
in another way, it would seem to be a thing that needs much caution. For when it is the 
case that the improvement would be small, but it is a bad thing to accustom men to repeal 
the laws lightly, it is clear that some mistakes both of the legislator and of the magistrate 
should be passed over; for the people will not be as much benefited by making an 
alteration as they will be harmed by becoming accustomed to distrust their rulers. (Trans. 
adapted from Rackham) 
 
Aristotle understands that laws may occasionally have to be changed, but seems 
to believe that in extreme democracies, as the plethos has authority over legislation, 
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changes are made too lightly, while in general laws should not be changed. Likewise, 
according to the reconstruction we have given, the Constitution of the Athenians 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 41) is basically correct when it identifies fourth-century democracy 
as the one in which most power is with the demos ‘for the people has placed itself in 
control of everything and administers everything through its decrees and its courts, in 
which the people holds the power’ (Harris, forthcoming a). These are accurate, yet 
somewhat hostile, assessments of the reality of Athenian fourth-century legislation, 
when legal change has eventually entered the remit of the powers of the people. As the 
sources for legislation in the fourth century BCE reveal, however, the people appear to 
have used their powers responsibly, not passing large numbers of laws.  
 Fourth-century nomothesia, both in its formal institutional arrangement and in 
the practices it gave rise to, is a truly remarkable achievement, all the more so as it 
sprang out of the contradictions and eventually the negotiation between institutions 
and an ideology that denied legal change and the rising conception of the sovereignty 
of the people. It is remarkable how closely the rules about nomothesia conformed to 
modern theories about the requirements of the rule of law when it comes to 
legislation. In his discussion of the ‘rule of law’ when applied to legislation, Raz 1977 
lists four main requirements: 1) proactive rather than retroactive legislation, which we 
have seen was covered by one of the laws enacted after the restoration of democracy 
in 403, 2) laws that are stable, which is guaranteed by all the checks and the hurdles 
of the new nomothesia procedure, 3) clear procedures and rules for making laws, that 
is clear rules of change, 4) courts having the power of 'judicial review' over the way in 
which the other principles are implemented, which is guaranteed by the creation of 
the graphe nomon me epitedeion theinai (the public action against inexpedient laws). 
This system of legislation, which guaranteed popular sovereignty and legal change in 
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an unprecedented fashion while also safeguarding the rule of law, was never 
challenged by oligarchs, and gave Athens unprecedented constitutional stability. It 
had to give way 80 years later only following Macedonian invasion and control. 
 
9.  Afterword: nomothesia under the Macedonians 
 
 To prevent this account from becoming too teleological, with institutional 
change leading inexorably toward the creation of rules of change that at the same time 
safeguarded the rule of law, this chapter will end with a few words about the aftermath 
of the Lamian war and the breakdown of fourth-century nomothesia (for a full 
discussion of these developments see Canevaro 2013c). 
 When the Macedonian general Antipater, after the battle of Crannon in 322 
BCE which ended the Lamian War, imposed his peace conditions on the Athenians, 
the Assembly had to agree to restrict the number of the citizens with full rights to 9000 
(Diod. 18.18.3-4), which must have forced the city to adopt extensive institutional 
changes in order to guarantee its smooth functioning. Among these changes, Suda (s.v. 
Demades) informs us that the lawcourts were dissolved. Whether this piece of 
information is reliable or not, the reduced number of citizens must have forced serious 
changes in the graphe paranomon and nomon me epitedeion theinai, and heavily 
conditioned their workings. But more generally, the sources attest enormous 
institutional innovations for this period, which are unlikely to have all gone through 
the checks and hurdles of nomothesia. It is more likely that nomothesia was either 
repealed or ignored. 
 Following the edict of Polyperchon, the Athenians went back to democracy in 
318, and it is possible that they returned to the status quo, but as early as the summer 
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of 317 the peace treaty with Cassander had appointed Demetrius of Phalerum in 
charge of Athens and imposed a timocratic constitution (Diod. 18.74.3-11). During the 
ten years of his rule, Demetrius acted as a nomothetes, reforming many of the laws of 
Athens, and it is likely that he was actually appointed to such a position (see Canevaro 
2013c: 63-6 with previous scholarship). So he inscribed his action within the old 
nomothetic tradition, and constructed his rule as a constitutional phase, and his role as 
that of a specially appointed nomothetes along the lines of Solon and Draco. Old 
traditions, by now over 300 years old, could still be used at this date to give legitimacy 
to radical constitutional reform, as they had in the late fifth century. The creation by 
him of a board of nomophylakes (guardians of the laws) (see Bearzot 2007 and 
Canevaro 2013c: 66-9 for discussions of this magistracy with previous bibliography), 
a typically aristocratic magistracy, who sat together with the proedroi in the Assembly 
and the Council and had the power to block new legislation, also shows that Demetrius 
had a view of the laws as unchangeable by the Assembly, or at least, consistently with 
Aristotle’s contention, as changeable only with great care and rarely. These 
institutions are strong evidence that nothing resembling the nomothesia in force from 
403 to 322 existed during Demetrius’ rule. 
 In 307 Athens was ‘freed’ by Demetrius Poliorcetes, and Diodorus (20.45.5, 
46.3) states that the demos regained its freedom and the patrios politeia. Once again, 
late-fifth century terminology is used, but Plutarch (Demetr. 10.2) makes it clear that 
with patrios politeia the Athenians in this case meant democracy. In order to restore 
democracy the demos had to undertake active legislation to undo the changes brought 
about by Demetrius of Phalerum. At this point we have the latest occurrence of 
nomothetai in Athens, yet a careful scrutiny of the sources shows that these were not 
the same as the ordinary nomothetai appointed many times a year before 322. They 
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were rather, once again according to the old nomothetic tradition, a special committee 
whose job was to propose new laws for the city, to be then approved by the Assembly 
(Canevaro 2013c: 69-79). These new laws were then to be inscribed by a special 
anagrapheus ton nomon (recorder of the laws) (IG II2 487). Their role was therefore 
akin to that of the 403 nomothetai. We have some parallels for such committees, 
nomothetai or nomographoi, imposed by the Antigonids, and by other Hellenistic 
monarchs, in various conquered cities in these years (e.g. Chios 32 = RO 84; Teos 59). 
A fragment of Alexis’ Hippeus (fr. 99) presupposes a strong connection between the 
nomothetai and Demetrius Poliorcetes and strongly suggests that these nomothetai 
were to some extent controlled (or at least perceived to be controlled) by Demetrius. 
Their creation at the same time is consistent with the nomothetic tradition, and exploits 
ideological models that have a long history, yet ultimately in order to legitimize 
external control over the city. 
 It is not surprising therefore that after Demetrius Poliorcetes was expelled 
from Athens in 301 we never hear again of nomothetai. The term is found in an 
inscription (SEG 37.89 = Themelis 2002), which is often dated to the third century or 
early second but should be dated instead to the fourth century BCE (Canevaro 2013c: 
79-80 with Rhodes in Lambert 2007: 80 n. 38). It is likely that while the institutional 
memory of the workings of fourth-century nomothesia had partially faded by then, the 
very term nomothetai had acquired associations that connected it to foreign control, 
after the use the two Demetriuses made of it. No literary or epigraphical evidence 
fully discloses how the Athenians legislated from then on, but it is likely from the 
absence of any mention of nomothetai that the Athenians simply legislated in the 
Assembly, without separate procedures. This final development was clearly a step 
backwards because the Athenians lost various procedural checks that had secured the 
 64 
conformity of their legislation to the rule of law. On the other hand, it was consistent 
with a path that had led from legislation as the irreversible action of special 
nomothetai to the progressive growth of the sovereignty of the people, who eventually 
reserved legislation for themselves, and finally got rid of any limitation on their full 
power to pass laws. On the other hand, some of the results of the innovative phase of 
403 remained. In particular, the terms nomoi and psephismata retained separate 
meanings (cf. their use side-by-side in the third century in honorary decrees: e.g. IG 
II2 404, 674, 776, 1006, 1028), and enacting nomoi remained a distinctive activity 
(e.g. Agora 16.261.1, honorary decree, praises a politician for enacting expedient 
laws). Their use was eventually extended to enactments not of the polis, but of private 
entities such as gymnasia and religious associations, which distinguished between 
general permanent rules, nomoi, and ad hoc decisions, psephismata (cf. Arnaoutoglou 
2003: 128-9). 
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